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I
INTRODUCTION
T HAT the utility of the trust device is attributable in great
measure to its flexibility is hardly debatable. The trust's re-
markable capacity for facilitating the accomplishment of a wide
variety of human objectives amply justifies Maitland's character-
ization of it as "the greatest and most distinctive achievement
performed by Englishmen in the field of jurisprudence."1 Today,
the trust is widely employed in this country for the effectuation
of diverse purposes ranging from family settlements, where the
beneficial enjoyment of wealth is divorced from the burdens of
its management and the responsibility for its preservation, to
speculative operations such as real estate development and oil
exploration, where a sound organizational framework for the
accumulation and investment of venture capital is required.2 In-
deed, the importance of the trust as a medium for the employment
and distribution of wealth is difficult to overestimate.
The significance of the trust is all the more remarkable when
one recalls that its existence is attributable to the "more or less
accidental circumstance that in England in the fifteenth century,
and for four hundred years thereafter, there were separate courts
of law and equity."3 The development of the modern trust from
the feudal active use is by now a familiar narrative.' Yet, it is
well to be reminded from time to time of the adamant refusal of
the English law courts to recognize either the trust estate as an
entity apart from the trustee's own assets, or beneficial interests
as enforceable against the trustee.
Of course, today the distinction between law and equity
retains only a fraction of its former significance, and for many
purposes the warring Coke and Ellesmere are merged in a single
judge. Ironically, however, vestiges of the old dichotomy are
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1. Maitland, Selected Essays 129 (1936).
2. For a listing of diverse business purposes for which trusts have been utilized
see Annot., 156 A-L.R. 22, 80-82 (1945).
3. 1 Scott, Trusts § 1, at 5 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter Scott].
4. See, e.g., Holdsworth, A History of English Law 407-80 (1924); Holds-
worth, An Historical Introduction to the Land Law 140-66 (1927); Maitland,
Equity 23-42 (2d ed. rev. Brunyate 1936); 1 Scott §§ 1.1-1.6; Bogert & Bogert,
Trusts and Trustees §§ 2-5 (2d ed. 1965) [hereinafter Bogert].
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preserved in some aspects of trust law even today, through
anachronistic perpetuations of the ancient legal antipathy which
inevitably clash with the benign equitable foundations of modern
trust law.
Third-party liabilities of trusts and trustees furnish a con-
spicuous example. With respect to contracts executed in the ad-
ministration of a trust, nonrecognition of the trust entity often
results in unfortunate consequences. This article will attempt an
exposition of some of the difficulties presented by the traditional
approach to contract liability, and a discussion of several statu-
tory modifications that are currently in effect.
II
THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH
"It is familiar learning that a trustee is personally liable for
those debts which he incurs in the course of the administration of
the trust estate,"5 and that he is entitled to "appropriate from
the assets of the trust such amount as is required to indemnify
him" for the performance of authorized contracts." In addition,
it is well established that a contract provision immunizing the
trustee from personal liability is valid, and will restrict the
promisee to such recovery as can be obtained from the trust as-
sets.7
Perhaps the leading (and certainly the most frequently
cited) American case on the subject of contract liability of trus-
tees is Taylor v. Davis' Adm'x.8 There, a former trustee of a land
development trust was in possession of trust property. Since the
trust estate was indebted to him, a lien was imposed in his favor
upon this property. However, he agreed to transfer it to two
successor trustees in consideration of the execution by them of a
contract promising to repay the indebtedness of the trust to him
out of "the moneys which shall come and remain in our hands as
trustees .. after first paying therefrom all taxes and current ex-
penses of [the trust] .... "10 This agreement was signed "S.
S. Stone, A Theory of Liability of Trust Estates for the Contracts and Torts
of the Trustee, 22 Colum. L. Rev. 527 (1922). The leading English case is Muir v.
City of Glasgow Bank, 4 App. Cas. 337 (1879). American cases are in accord. Sec
Restatement (Second), Trusts § 262 (1959) [hereinafter Restatement]; B3ogert
§ 712 (1960) ; 3 Scott § 262.
6. Stone, supra note 5, at 527. English and American authorities are numerous.
See Bogert § 718 (.1960) ; 3 Scott §§ 244-46.
7. In re Robinson's Settlement, [1912] 1 Ch. 717, 728-29, firmly established
this doctrine in England. For American authorities see Bogert § 714 (1960) ; 3 Scott
§ 263.
8. 110 U.S. 330 (1884).
9. See Restatement § 244, comment c; 3 Scott § 244.1.
10. 110 U.S. at 330-31.
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Staats Taylor, Edwin Parsons, Trustees of the Cairo City Prop-
erty." When the promisee died some five and one-half years later,
the contract was still unperformed. After his death, the successor
trustees executed an identical contract in favor of his administra-
trix, confirming and renewing their obligation. Several years later,
the administratrix brought an action at law against the two suc-
cessor trustees, alleging that they had failed and refused to pay
this contract claim even though large sums of money had come
into their hands over and above the amounts necessary to pay
taxes and current expenses of the trust.
It appeared that, at the time the contract with the plaintiff
was executed and at the time her action was commenced, the
defendants had "no money of the trust fund in their hands.""
The circuit court found, though, that at various times subsequent
to the execution of the second contract, the defendants had had
sufficient funds in hand to discharge the obligation. Finding that
the defendants thus had wrongfully refused to pay the plaintiff,
the lower court entered judgment in her favor against them per-
sonally. They brought a writ of error to the Supreme Court, con-
tending that by the express terms of the contract their liability
was limited to trust assets in their possession; hence, judgment
against them individually was improper.
Their contention was rejected by the Supreme Court, in the
following terms:
In this case the contract is the personal contract of the plain-
tiffs in error. Before it was made the trust estate and the plaintiffs
in error, in their capacity of trustees, were already bound for the
debt due to Davis [the decedent], and he had the right to keep
possession of the trust estate until he was paid. It is clear, from
the contract and the circumstances under which it was made, that
Davis consented to yield possession of the trust property on con-
dition that he received some security for his payment other than
the mere liability of the trust estate. He therefore took the con-
tract in suit, and yielded the possession of the trust estate without
exacting payment of his demands.
We are of opinion, therefore, that the plaintiffs in error,
having assumed a personal liability, the suit was well brought
against them in a court of law, and that the court did not err in
rendering judgment against them in their individual capacity.'
The Court's conclusion as to a contractual assumption of personal
liability seems unsound. The contract clearly contemplated pay-
ment out of trust funds, and the validity of such a stipulation can
scarcely be questioned. Moreover, since the promisee had full
11. Id. at 333.
12. Id. at 335-36, 337.
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knowledge of the representative capacity of the promisors, there
could be no contention that he contracted with the defendants as
principals.
It should be noted that the Supreme Court concurred in the
lower court's finding that the defendants had, from time to time,
been in possession of sufficient trust funds to pay the plaintiff's
claim. Therefore, the result of the case is sound. Even assuming
that the trustees acted properly in making the contract, they
breached it by their refusal, over a long period,1" to pay the
plaintiff out of trust funds in their possession. For this wilful
breach, they properly incurred personal liability. Had there been
trust funds in their hands sufficient to discharge the contractual
liability, the plaintiff could have brought a bill in equity against
them in their representative capacity, requesting the chancellor
to compel payment. 4 Assuming that the contract was properly
entered into on behalf of the trust, there can be no doubt that
such relief would have been proper. Thus, it does not appear that
the action at law was plaintiff's exclusive remedy; rather, it was
her only practicable remedy.
The opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Woods contains the
following passage, which has been quoted numerous times in later
cases:
A trustee is not an agent. An agent represents and acts for
his principal, who may be either a natural or artificial person. A
trustee may be defined generally as a person in whom some estate,
interest, or power in or affecting property is vested for the benefit
of another. When an agent contracts in the name of his principal,
the principal contracts and is bound, but the agent is not. When
a trustee contracts as such, unless he is bound no one is bound, for
he has no principal. The trust estate cannot promise; the contract
is therefore the personal undertaking of the trustee. As a trustee
holds the estate, although only with the power and for the purpose
of managing it, he is personally bound by the contracts he makes
as trustee, even when designating himself as such. The mere use
by the promisor of the name of trustee or any other name of office
or employment will not discharge him. Of course when a trustee
acts in good faith for the benefit of the trust, he is entitled to in-
demnify himself for his engagement out of the estate in his hands,
and for this purpose a credit for his expenditures will be allowed
in his accounts by the court having jurisdiction thereof.15
13. More than twenty-two years elapsed between the execution of the orig-
inal contract and the decision by the Supreme Court.
14. In the following cases, even though the trustee was held personally liable,
the opinions indicate that an action could have been maintained against the "trust
estate": Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Gibbons, 168 F. Supp. 867 (D. Utah 1958);
Allegheny Tank Car Co. v. Culbertson, 288 Fed. 406 (NfD. Tex. 1923); Bradner
Smith & Co. v. Williams, 178 Ill. 420, 53 N.E. 358 (1899); Gnadt v. Moore, 297
S.W. 468 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927).
15. 110 U.S. at 334-35.
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Because of this gratuitous statement, the Taylor case has fre-
quently been cited in support of the general proposition that a
trustee assumes personal liability whenever he contracts on behalf
of the trust, unless the contract specifically limits the promisee's
recovery to the trust assets. Such a broad construction is not
warranted by the facts or the actual holding in Taylor because
these trustees could have been held personally liable even if the
Court had found an express agreement that the plaintiff should
look only to the trust assets for satisfaction. In this event, per-
sonal liability would be predicated on a tort theory: 10 trustees
are not permitted wrongfully to frustrate the promisee's recovery
by dissipating trust assets in their possession."7 This is the
soundest justification for the holding in Taylor.
The Taylor opinion cites an earlier Supreme Court case,
Duvall v. Craig,"8 as supporting authority for its conclusion that
the contract sued upon was a personal undertaking of the trustees.
In that case, the defendant trustees conveyed trust property to
the plaintiff with covenants of warranty, including a covenant
against prior grants and encumbrances. This covenant was
worded as follows: "Robert Johnson and Elijah Craig, trustees to
the said John Craig, for themselves, their heirs, executors and
administrators, do covenant... with [the plaintiff] .... ,1 Be-
low the signature of Robert Johnson and Elijah Craig appeared
the words "Trustee for John Craig."
The grantee brought an action in covenant against the gran-
tors, alleging that a survey of the property conveyed had pre-
viously been assigned by one of the trustees and John Craig to a
third party. This person had procured a patent executed by the
Governor of Virginia, which conferred upon him a paramount
title to the property. The defendant trustees demurred, contend-
ing that they could not be held liable in an action at law for an
agreement executed by them as trustees. Their demurrer was
sustained by the circuit court, but the Supreme Court reversed.
16. The trust having no assets, there could of course be no recovery on the
contract. Nor, since the contract was authorized, could personal liability be im-
posed on the trustee for breach of warranty of authority to execute iL Where such
conduct amounted to a breach of trust, the trustee '-as held personally liable to
the promisees in James Stewart & Co. v. National Shawmut Bank, 69 F.2d 694 (1st
Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 722 (1935). Even if the misapplication of funds
did not amount to a breach of trust, the promisee should still recover on a theory
of tortious interference with contractual relations. See Prosser, Torts § 123 (3d ed.
1964).
17. See Restatement § 263(3) ; 3 Scott § 263.4.
18. 15 US. (2 Wheat.) 45 (1817).
19. Id. at 51.
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The Court's opinion by Mr. Justice Story makes short shrift of
the defendant's argument:
A trustee, merely as such, is, in general, only suable in equity.
But if he chooses to bind himself by a personal covenant, he is
liable at law, for a breach thereof, in the same manner as any other
person, although he describe himself as covenanting as trustee; for,
in such case, the covenant binds him personally, and the addition
of the words "as trustee" is but matter of description, to show the
character in which he acts, for his own protection, and in no
degree affects the rights or remedies of the other party. The
authorities are very elaborate on this subject. An agent or executor
who covenants in his own name, and yet describes himself as agent
or executor, is personally liable, for the obvious reason, that the
one has no principal to bind, and the other substitutes himself for
his principal.
The reasoning upon this point disposes, also, of the second
made at the argument, viz., that the covenant being made by
Robert Johnson and Elijah Craig, as trustees, no individual judg-
ment can be rendered against them .... for at law a judgment
against a trustee in such special capacity is utterly unknown.20
The trustees may have been surprised to learn of their "choice"
to bind themselves personally. The grantee was clearly on notice
that they were conveying trust property in their representative
capacity. The covenants, however, did expressly bind "them-
selves, their heirs, executors and administrators." Thus there is
some foundation for the conclusion that they voluntarily incurred
personal liability. It is simply not credible, though, that one who
stands to receive no personal gain from a transaction would
ordinarily assume personal liability for resultant losses.21 At the
very least, it would seem that the promisee should have the bur-
den of proving that personal liability was bargained for.
It is significant, however, that although the opinion in
Duvall, as that in Taylor, suggests that the trustees voluntarily
incurred personal liability, neither decision is dependent on such a
finding. In both instances, the trustees knowingly and wrongfully
prevented the promisee from receiving the object of his bargain;
and in both cases there apparently were no trust funds available
to recompense him.
The rule enunciated in these two Supreme Court cases has
been followed in several analogous situations where the trustee
was not authorized to enter into the contract,22 or executed it
20. Id. at 56-57.
21. Speaking generally, there might no doubt arise an inference (if not
rebutted by other circumstances) that a person who derived no benefit
himself, and who acted only for the benefit of others ... would not intend
thereby to expose himself to personal liability if it could be avoided.
Muir v. City of Glasgow Bank, 4 App. Cas. 337, 368 (1879) (Lord Penzance).
22. See, e.g., Dunham v. Blood, 207 Mass. 512, 93 N.E. 804 (1911) ruling
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negligently, 3 or wrongfully refused to perform it,2 4 or defrauded
the promisee2 5 In addition, personal liability has been imposed
upon liquidating trustees of businesses who contracted for goods
or services knowing that the business assets were exhausted.2 In
all of these situations, it would appear that the trustee's miscon-
duct is sufficient ground for the imposition of personal liability.
Of course, if the trustee represents that he has assumed personal
liability, this representation is binding.27 Similarly, if the prom-
isee is unaware of the existence of the trust, and believes himself
to be dealing with a principal, personal liability is properly im-
posed on the trustee. s
that, where the trustee executed an unauthorized note "as trustee" the holder is
restricted to an action against the trustee individually. Had the note been author-
ized, though, the plaintiff would have been able to bring a creditor's bill in equity
to recover out of trust assets.
In some cases the trustee who executed an unauthorized note as "trustee for
X" has been held personally liable on the note. Sheets v. Security First Mortgage
Co., 293 DI. App. 222, 12 N.E.2d 324 (1937); Brown v. Churchill, 89 N.H. 441,
200 Atl. 393 (1938) (trustee executed an unauthorized contract); Fehlinger v.
Wood, 134 Pa. 517, 19 AUt. 746 (1890).
To the same effect are cases wherein an executor or administrator improperly
continued his decedent's business, incurring unpaid debts. See, e.g., Marshall Field &
Co. v. Himelstein, 253 Mich. 355, 235 N.W. 181 (1931); Multorpor Co. v. Reed,
122 Ore. 605, 260 Pac. 203 (1927).
23. In Horst v. Gaston, 217 Ala. 290, 116 So. 141 (1928), the trustee agreed
to sel trust property to plaintiff, and procured court approval of the terms of sale.
The plaintiff presented a written contract to the trustee containing the terms pre-
viously approved and a provision whereby the seller agreed to pay him a commis-
sion of five per cent of the purchase price. The trustee, unmindful of this insertion,
executed the contract on behalf of the trust estate. Plaintiff sued the estate for his
commission, but recovery was denied. The trustee's inadvertence or negligence "can-
not be made the permissible basis of an allowance out of the trust estate. The
issue as to whether such commission should be paid is a personal matter between
[plaintiff and the trustee] ... " Id. at 291, 116 So. at 142.
24. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Schwartz, 214 Mass. 371, 101 N.E. 1070 (1913),
where an administrator was held personally liable for a real estate commision
where he contracted to sell real property belonging to the estate and defaulted on
his obligation to convey.
25. See, e.g., Piff v. Berresheim, 405 MII. 617, 92 N.E2d 113 (1990). Plaintiff
paid the trustee in full for two lots owned by a land development trust, but the
trustee nevertheless conveyed them to a third party. Personal liability was imposed
upon the trustee, as well as beneficiaries who knew and approved of the conveyance.
26. See, e.g., Gnadt v. Moore, 297 S.W. 468 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927). The opinion
states that the plaintiff also had a remedy in equity against the trust estate. This
remedy is not exclusive, however, and the action at law may be maintained against
the trustee individually. Id. at 469. See also Bradner Smith & Co. v. Williams, 178
11. 420, 53 N.. 358 (1899).
27. In Koken Iron Works v. Kinealy, 86 Mo. App. 199 (1900), the trustee of
a business trust was held personally liable for rental payments where he had
assured the landlord that, "as long as he ... was ... trustee, the rent would be
paid promptly.'" Id. at 201.
28. See, e.g., Curtis v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 3 Cal. App. 2d 612, 40 P.2d
562 (1935). This action was based on fraudulent representations by officers of the
defendant corporation, which induced plaintiff to buy certain lots it owned. De-
fendant contended that it should not be held personally liable, since it was acting as
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But what of the situation where the trustee enters into an
authorized contract, and is guilty of no misconduct? If, in such a
case, the promisee knows that the trustee is acting in a represent-
ative capacity, should not his recovery be out of (and limited to)
trust assets? This would analogize trustee liability to that of
agents and corporate officers who execute authorized contracts
on behalf of their principals.2 9
The rule with respect to trustees is, however, otherwise: even
in such situations as just described, the trustee still incurs per-
sonal liability. The reason for such a holding is, of course, sug-
gested by the Taylor case. The trust is not a legally recognized
entity, and since there is no "principal," there can be no "agent."
The court of law is thus forced to reach a conclusion that is
patently false: that the trustee is really acting as a principal in
his own behalf.
trustee under an unrecorded deed of trust. This contention was rejected, and a
judgment against the defendant corporation individually was affirmed upon this
reasoning:
Where it [the defendant] has thus acted as, and in its contracts repre-
sented itself to be, the owner of the properties it should not be allowed to
attempt to shift its responsibility by proving that it was not actually
acting as owner but as trustee of an express trust under an unrecorded
declaration of trust of which the purchaser had no notice.
Id. at 620, 40 P.2d at 565. Cf. Whalen v. Ruegamer, 123 App. Div. 585, 108
N.Y. Supp. 38 (2d Dep't 1908). This result is consistent with the agency doctrine
that one who contracts with an agent for an undisclosed principal may hold the
agent liable for performance. See Restatement (Second), Agency § 322 (1958).
29. With respect to contract liability of agents see Restatement (Second),
Agency § 320, comment a (1958):
One who purports to contract on behalf of a designated person does not
manifest by this that he is making a contract on his own account, and
only where he so manifests does the agent become a party to a contract
which he makes for the principal.
See also id. § 328.
Corporate officers are "agents, usually appointed and controlled by the board
of directors." Ballantine, Corporations § 49 (rev. ed. 1946). "The officers of a
corporation, whether it is close or publicly held, are in legal theory agents of the
corporate entity." 2 O'Neal, Close Corporations § 8.05, at 93 (1958).
30. In Royal L. Brockob Constr. Co. v. Trust Co., 6 Ill. App. 2d 565, 128
N.E.2d 620 (1955), the promisee knew that the promisor was a fiduciary, but had
no notice of the identity and extent of the trust estate, nor of the provisions of the
trust instrument. The trustee was held personally liable. However, a number of
cases have held that, where the promisee had actual or constructive notice of trust
provisions denying personal liability of trustees for authorized contracts, his
recovery should be limited to trust assets. E.g., James Stewart & Co. v. National
Shawmut Bank, 75 F.2d 148 (1st Cir. 1935); East River Say. Bank v. 245
Broadway Corp., 284 N.Y. 470, 31 N.E.2d 906 (1940) ; Pennsylvania Co. for Ins.
on Lives & Granting Annuities v. Wallace, 346 Pa. 532, 31 A.2d 71 (1943).
Scott says:
Such a provision in the trust instrument, however, does not of itself pre-
clude the trustee from being personally liable . . But where the other
party to the contract has notice of the provision, it may be considered
with other facts in determining whether it was the understanding of the
parties to the contract that the trustee should not be personally liable.
3 Scott § 263.2, at 2046.
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At common law, this conclusion was inescapable. Since the
trustee was regarded as the sole owner of trust property, no dis-
tinction was drawn between it and property owned by him in-
dividuallyr. An action at law for the recovery of a contract claim
would lie against the trustee individually, and execution could
be levied against any of his assets. Thus, the trust res was liable
to execution for the payment of his personal debts, as well as con-
tract claims incurred on behalf of the cestuis que trust.3 Similarly,
judgment creditors whose claims arose out of the administration
of the trust could levy execution against any property owned by
the trustee.
For example, suppose X is seized of three parcels of real
estate-one owned by him outright, the second held as trustee for
Y, and the third as trustee for Z. At common law, all three parcels
would be liable to execution by X's personal creditors, as well as
creditors whose claims related to the administration of the trusts
for Y and Z. V and Z could prevent X's individual creditors from
levying against the property held for their benefit by appealing
to the Chancellor to restrain execution of the judgment against
these assets.32 In this way, trust property was rendered immune
31. In the classical period of the history of trusts, courts of law made no
distinction between trust property and the private property of the trustee.
He was the legal owner of both; and the trust property as well as his
private property was subject to levy of execution upon a judgment against
the trustee.
Stone, supra note 5, at 540.
32. Equitable enforcement of the trust against the trustees creditors is
listed by Maitland as one of the "logical stages" in the development of the trust:
There seems to have been a good deal of difficulty about this step--more
than we might have supposed-and it was not taken finally until after the
Restoration in 1660. Just at the same time the Court of Chancery %vas
beginning to insist that the cestui que trust's creditors could attack his
equitable rights. However, it became well established that these rights were
good against the creditors of the trustee.
Maitland, Equity 112-13 (2d ed. rev. Brunyate .1936).
And sure there cannot be a greater solecism, than that in two sov-
ereign independent courts, established in the same country, exercising con-
current jurisdiction, and over the same subject-matter, there should exst
in a single instance two different rules of property, clashing with or con-
tradicting each other.
3 Blackstone, Commentaries 441 (1768). The consolidation of these two (and
other) disparate judicial tribunals was effected by the Judicature Act of 1873
which expressly provided that rules of law and equity should be administered
concurrently. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, § 24.
That the equitable rules and procedures regarding trusts attained supremacy is
indicated by the remark of Collins, M.R., in Jennings v. Blather, [1902] 1 K13. 1,
S (CA. 1901).
The execution creditor, Jennings, having obtained judgment against Blather
[the trustee] for a debt due from him, was only entitled to have taken in
execution on that judgment goods of which Blather was the beneficial
owner, and not goods which, like those in question, were only his subject
to a trust.
It is not surprising, though, that the original English procedure was followed
in some early American cases. See, e.g., Giles v. Palmer, 49 N.C. 386, 387 (1857):
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from execution for payment of the trustee's individual debts. But
what of the creditor whose claim arose out of the administration
of the trust for Y? With respect to this claim, it might seem that
the parcel held in trust for Y, as well as X's individual' property,
should be liable to execution.
Equity procedure, however, did not permit any remedy so
simple and direct. It was required that the creditor first exhaust the
trustee's individual property before seeking recovery out of trust
assets. In the event that he was unable to obtain full satisfaction
of his judgment, he could bring a creditor's bill in equity against
the trustee. If he could show that his judgment against the trus-
tee was still unsatisfied after exhaustion of the trustee's individual
property, and that the claim was of the type for which the trustee
was entitled to indemnity against the trust assets, a court of
equity would permit the creditor to attach the trustee's right of
indemnity and obtain satisfaction out of the trust property.83 The
creditor's recovery was completely dependent upon the trustee's
right of indemnity, which could be defeated in a number of ways.
For instance, if the contract were unauthorized, no right of in-
demnity would arise. Also, the trustee's right of indemnity was
subject to setoffs asserted by the beneficiaries, arising out of the
maladministration of the trust in any respect: These setoffs could
reduce or nullify the trustee's right of indemnity; they would
have an identical effect on the contract creditor's claim.,4 Thus,
his recovery might be diminished or wiped out entirely by a set-
off arising out of a completely unrelated transaction.
Although this last-mentioned aspect of equity procedure has
been soundly criticized by an eminent authority,5 it is probably
A purchaser at a sheriff's sale succeeds to all the rights of the defendant
[trustee] in the execution .... The defendant, in the execution, cannot
deny the purchaser's right to stand in his shoes. Should the plaintiff [trans-
feree of the purchaser at the execution sale], in this case, attempt to deprive
the trustee of the possession of the premises, the remedy of the cestui que
trust will be in a Court of Equity.
See also Stone, supra note 5, at 530: "When the judgment operates only to
bind the trustee personally, equity will protect the trust property from levy and
execution." In Kincaid v. Hensel, 185 Wash. 503, 55 P.2d 1050 (1936), the prom-
isees had recovered judgment against the trustee for breach of a contract to convey
trust property, and attempted to levy execution on trust assets. At the behest of
the beneficiary, the Supreme Court of Washington set aside the execution, saying
that "the trust property can be subjected to the obligation only by an equitable
action in rem." Id. at 506, 55 P.2d at 1052.
33. See Restatement § 268; Bogert § 716 (1960) ; 3 Scott § 268.
34. See Restatement § 268, comments d and e; Bogert § 716 (1960) ; 3 Scott§ 268.2. But this limitation is ineffective to the extent the trust estate has bene-
fitted from the contract. Restatement § 269, comment a; 3 Scott §§ 269, 269.1.
35. In such a case, the cestui que trust may continue to enjoy the full eco-
nomic benefit of the trust property, including the benefit conferred upon It
by the creditor of the trustee without the necessity of paying for it from
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still followed in most American jurisdictions. In defense of this
procedure, it has been said that it quite properly separates the
question of the validity of the creditor's claim from the question
of who (as between the trustee and the trust estate) shall ulti-
mately bear the burden of payment30 On the former question,
the financial interests of the trustee and beneficiaries are identi-
cal; on the latter, they are squarely in conflict. Further, it can be
contended that the traditional procedure provides the most ap-
propriate forum for the resolution of each issue. If he recovers
judgment against the trustee personally, the creditor can obtain
satisfaction out of the trustee's assests. Having paid the judg-
ment, the trustee may then obtain a determination of whether or
not he is entitled to indemnity out of the trust estate. This deter-
mination is customarily rendered in an accounting by a court
having supervisory jurisdiction over the trust. It is binding on the
trustee and all beneficiaries properly before the court."
IIn
A CRITICISM OF THE TRADITIONAL VIEW
The traditional rationale just stated quite properly recog-
nizes that any claim against a trustee arising out of the adminis-
tration of the trust may present two separate issues, one of which
places the trustee's individual interests in conflict with his fiduci-
ary duty. The traditional procedure is, however, vulnerable to
attack from at least three quarters. First, in the case of clearly
the trust property or otherwise-the one authentic instance in the law where
one may pay his debts with his losses.
Stone, supra note 5, at 529.
36. The rule against allowing persons dealing with trustees to proceed directly
against the trust, is founded on public policy. The public interest requires
that trustees shall incur the liability with the risk of its being disallowed,
for cause, when they come to settle their accounts. This secures their good
faith and keeps a salutary check upon their liberality in dealing with trust
estates.
Taylor v. Crook, 136 Ala. 354, 374, 34 So. 905, 909 (1902). See Bogert § 712, at
451-52 (1960):
Furthermore, although not germane to the origin of the rule, it can be urged
that original personal liability of the trustee on contracts is fairer to the
beneficiaries than estate liability. If an action against him as trustee could
be maintained at law and judgment satisfied out of the trust property, the
cestui might be held to be concluded as to the propriety and fairness of the
contract without an opportunity to be heard. The trustee, if he had made
an injudicious contract, would be apt to keep silent as to his breach of trust
and cover up the wrong. But if the original liability at law is on the trustee
personally, the cestui is not bound as to the legality and wisdom of the con-
tract by any settlement or litigation between trustee and the third person.
The burden will be on the trustee, in his settlement with the cestui, to prove
that the contract he made was within his powers and was fair in its terms,
so that he may justify having applied trust property in satisfaction of his
contract liability or may get reimbursement from the trust property for
moneys of his own which he has spent on that account.
37. See Restatement § 220; Bogert §§ 956, 974 (1962) ; 2 Scott § 220.
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authorized contracts, adherence to the traditional procedure
places an unnecessary burden on a creditor where the trustee is
insolvent or not amenable to service of process. Although the
trust estate must bear the ultimate burden of the contract, the
creditor nevertheless must pursue the trustee and exhaust all
remedies against him before being permitted to bring a creditor's
bill. Second, having brought his creditor's bill, he is subject to set-
offs asserted by beneficiaries against the trustee, even though they
arise out of transactions completely unrelated to the contract un-
der which he claims.
In rebuttal, it can be argued that these are merely instances
of inconvenience or loss to the creditor arising out of procedures
instituted to protect beneficiaries against improper diminution of
trust assets. As such, they reflect a value judgment that some
degree of inconvenience to-and some risk of loss by-creditors
is acceptable in order to protect beneficiaries against reduction of
their beneficial interests by payment of unauthorized contract
claims. This represents, perhaps, the ultimate argument in de-
fense of the traditional procedure. But it is considerably weak-
ened, if not altogether discredited, by consideration of our third
point: the doctrine of exoneration. As Scott says:
Where the trustee incurs an obligation on behalf of the trust
estate, it is frequently the individual obligation of the trustee;
but if the obligation was properly incurred by him in the adminis-
tration of the trust he is entitled to discharge it out of the trust
property. He has, in other words, not merely a right of reimburse-
ment where he has made payment out of his individual funds,
but he has a right of exoneration, a power to use trust property in
discharging the obligation.38
If the trustee in the proper administration of the trust incurs
an obligation to a third person, and he has discharged the obliga-
tion out of his individual property, he is entitled to reimbursement
out of the trust estate. If he has not discharged the obligation out
of his individual property, he is entitled to apply the trust property
to the discharge of the obligation. In other words, he has not only
a right of reimbursement, but a right of exoneration3 9
Dean (later Chief Justice) Stone pointed out that this so-called
right of exoneration is actually a "power to apply the trust funds
for payment of all expenses necessary or proper for the ad-
ministration of the trust whether ... [the trustee] be entitled to
reimbursement or not. 4°
Bogert implies that the trustee's exercise of his power to
38. 3 Scott § 244, at 1961. See also 3 Scott § 246.
39. 3 Scott § 268, at 2072.
40. Stone, supra note 5, at 534.
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apply trust funds in this manner is dependent upon prior author-
ization by a court of equity.41 This is probably unsound;4 2 it is
certainly contrary to trust administration practice.43 Trustees
routinely discharge all obligations'incurred on behalf of the trust
out of trust funds, and for good reason. It is unrealistic to require
a trustee to meet all trust obligations out of his individual funds,
with reimbursement being postponed until judicially ordered in an
interim or final accounting. Few trustees would have sufficient
working capital to operate in this manner; even fewer would be
willing to tie up their funds so unprofitably. It is equally unsound
to compel the trustee to seek prior judicial authorization for each
expenditure out of the trust estate. With respect to even a rela-
41. If a trustee is threatened with a judgment against himself personally, or
with execution out of his personal property, he can bring a suit to prevent
the judgment being obtained, or the execution enforced, and to compel the
liability to fall on the trust property or the cestuis, or upon such other
party as the court may consider the appropriate bearer of the burden....
This right is called the right to exoneration, that is, the right to have the
court remove original liability from the trustee.
Bogert § 718, at 486-87 (1960).
42. The only authority cited for Bogert's view of exoneration is Hobbs v.
Wayet, 36 Ch. D. 256 (1887). There, a woman had purchased bank stock with her
own funds, registering it in the joint names of herself and another. She predeceased
the other tenant, and six years later the banking corporation failed. The liquidator
levied an assessment against the estate of the surviving joint tenant, who had died in
the meantime. His executor brought an action against the personal representative of
the original purchaser, seeking indemnity out of her estate for the assessment. This re-
lief was granted on the theory that the surviving tenant had accepted an interest
(and consequent liability) in the stock at the request of the purchaser, and "'any
one who requests another to incur a liability which would otherwise have fallen on
himself is, in general, bound at law as well as in equity, to indemnify him?" 36 Ch.
D. at 258.
The court held that, on the facts of the case, the survivor's executor held the
stock in trust for the purchaser's estate. Thus the case is authority for the condu-
sion that a trustee may bring an action to compel a beneficiary or third person to
discharge a liability asserted against trust assets, and that such relief will be granted
upon a proper showing. It is not authority for the proposition that a trustee nust
receive court approval before applying trust assets in his possession to the payment
of trust indebtedness. Compare the comment of Lord Justice Stirling in Jennings v.
Mather, [1902] 1 KI.B. 1, 6 (CA. 1901): "[W]hen the legal title to trust property
is vested in the trustee, he has a right to resort to that property, without the assist-
ance of the Court, for the purpose of indemnity against liabilities properly incurred
by him in the administration of the trust."
The American view is aptly stated as follows:
The trustee, therefore, who has incurred indebtedness in the proper manage-
ment of the trust estate may apply the trust funds in payment of the in-
debtedness, and he may likewise do so by paying for the necessary goods
and services even though he has assumed no personal obligation to pay for
them. Every trustees accounting, involving expenditures of trust funds for
the proper expenses of the trust, is a recognition of this principle.
Stone, supra note 5, at 533-34.
43. "The customary method of trustees of paying indebtedness incurred by
them in the administration of the estate is to draw a check upon the trust bank
account in favor of the creditor.' Id. at 538.
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tively small estate, the trustee may consummate dozens of trans-
actions each year. The delays incident to hearings on petitions for
authority to discharge each obligation out of trust funds would
hamstring the trustee, and the expense of such proceedings would
deplete trust assets.
Since it is the accepted practice for trustees to apply trust
assets to discharge contract obligations incurred on behalf of the
trust estate, it follows that the initial burden of all contracts,
whether technically "authorized" or not, is borne by the bene-
ficiaries. In this context, it becomes clear that the rule imposing
personal liability on trustees furnishes inadequate (if any) pro-
tection for beneficiaries. As a practical matter, their only effective
means of protection against unauthorized contracts are: (1)
thorough accounting procedures at reasonably frequent inter-
vals;44 and (2) a requirement that trustees post bond or its equiv-
44. The duty to keep records and to submit them to a court of equity for
approval is an elementary responsibility of all trustees. See Bogcrt §§ 962-63 (1962);
2 Scott § 172. Beneficiaries are entitled to informal accountings by the trustee at
reasonable intervals, unless the trust instrument provides to the contrary; but the
settlor cannot relieve the trustee from submission to equity's supervisory jurisdic-
tion. Wood v. Honeyman, 178 Ore. 484, 566, 169 P.2d 131, 166 (1946). But cf. Re-
statement § 172, comment d.
Most jurisdictions have statutory provisions dealing with formal accountings.
It is not clear whether such enactments are intended to supersede the Inherent
power of equity to require accountings, or merely to lay down formalized guide-
lines for trustees. The latter alternative seems more plausible, in the absence of a
clear legislative direction that the statutory regulations shall be exclusive. It has
been held, though, that a petition for an accounting prior to the time fixed by
statute is premature. Matter of Estate of Whitman, 22 Ill. 511 (1859). As will be
seen, complete judicial deference to statutory. regulation is unwise-especially In
jurisdictions where the statutes in force do not purport to bind all trustees.
The range of variation in the statutory requirements for accountings is con-
siderable. The Uniform Trustees' Accounting Act provides for the filing of an Inven-
tory within thirty days after the trustee takes possession of the trust estate, annual
intermediate accountings thereafter, a "final accounting" at the time of termination,
and a "distribution accounting" after the trust assets have been finally distributed.
Uniform Trustees' Accounting Act §§ 2, 3, 4, and 5 apply these requirements to tes-
tamentary trustees, and §§ 12 and 13 render them applicable to nontestamentary
trustees as well. Section 17 provides that these requirements shall not abridge the
judicial power to supervise trust administration, nor prevent a court from excusing
a trustee from performing any duty imposed by the act. Section 15 provides that
the settlor may relieve the trustee from any duty imposed by the act, without
affecting the jurisdiction of the court which "does not depend upon" the act. This
act is in effect in Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico, and the Virgin Islands.
By contrast, the statutes of at least ten states (Alaska, California, Illinois, Mon-
tana, New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) appar-
ently do not require periodic intermediate accountings. In these jurisdictions,
accountings are ordered only upon request by a beneficiary or trustee.
The statutory requirements of the remaining jurisdictions fall between the ex-
tremes represented by the Uniform Trustees' Accounting Act and the accounting-
by-request procedure just indicated. Many states require periodic accountings only
of testamentary trustees, and in some the interval between required accountings Is
as long as three years. See generally Bogert §§ 965-69 (1962).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
CONTRACT LIABILITY
alent in sufficient amount to afford protection against trustee in-
solvency pending the conclusion of such proceedings.4s
Finally, it might be argued that the traditional rules and
procedures constitute some protection for beneficiaries by holding
the trustee to a high standard of care and prudence in executing
contracts on behalf of the trust. The unsoundness of this argu-
ment becomes apparent, however, upon a consideration of the
ease with which knowledgeable trustees can avoid the personal
liability rules altogether. As previously stated, it is well estab-
lished that the trustee incurs no personal liability if the contract
provides that the promisee shall look solely to the trust assets for
performance.46 A satisfactory rationale for this result has been
elusive, though. Even if the promisee's agreement is treated as
a renunciation of his cause of action against the trustee individ-
ually, how can it impose direct liability upon the trust estate?
Some authorities'have held that the effect of such an agreement is
to transfer the trustee's right of indemnity to the promisee.47 The
promisee may then bring a bill in equity against the trustee in
his representative capacity, and recover out of trust assets.48
Courts ordinarily engage in no "active" supervision of trustees; their jurisdic-
tion must be invoked by the filing of an appropriate petition by an interested party.
In the absence of a requirement for periodic intermediate accountings, it is thus
possible for a trustee's administration to continue from creation of the trust to ter-
mination without any formal accounting. This is an unwise and imprudent result,
especially where the beneficiaries are under a disability. Clearly, accounting statutes
in many states offer inadequate assurance that a trustee's unauthorized or unlawful
acts will be promptly discovered. See Bogert, The Proposed Uniform Trustees'
Accounting Act, 21 Cornell L.Q. 529, 548-50 (1936).
It should be mentioned that national banks exercising fiduciary powers are re-
quired to keep records of fiduciary activities, and submit to inspection by the staff
of the Comptroller of the Currency. 12 C.F.R. § 9.8(a) (1962).
45. Bonding requirements are imposed by statute in most jurisdictions, with
considerable disparity of treatment. Some statutes require bond of all trustees,
others only of testamentary trustees, and a few impose this requirement only upon
corporate trustees. A common provision exempts corporate trustees which meet cer-
tain capital and surplus requirements, or which have deposited securities with the
state banking commissioner. See Bogert § 151 (1965).
Testators are generally empowered to dispense with the bonding requirement,
but courts in some states may impose bond despite the testators direction to the
contrary. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code § 2109.04 (Page 1954).
The usual exemptions, for noncorporate trustees of (1) inter vivos trusts and
(2) testamentary trusts which contain an express dispensation, are of questionable
wisdom. The exemption for corporate trustees is justified only if the alternative re-
quirements are sufficient to guarantee continued solvency with reasonable certainty.
The combination of overly broad bonding exemptions with undue lenience in
intermediate accounting requirements can present an alarming potential for uncom-
pensated diminution of the beneficial interests in a trust.
46. See note 7 supra.
47. Jessup v. Smith, 223 N.Y. 203, 119 N.E. 403 (1918). See Chaplin, Express
Trusts and Powers § 178 (1897).
48. 3 Scott § 271 suggests two alternative justifications for this result: the
"exemption" theory, under which the promisee can recover out of trust assets only
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But the trustee's right of indemnity comes into existence only
at the time he expends his own funds for the benefit of the trust.
Where there has been no such expenditure, it would seem that the
promisee really has no derivative claim at all. Even should this
hurdle be surmounted (or ignored), the requirement for exhaus-
tion of legal remedies must be dealt with. Can the trustee
"waive" this requirement on behalf of the beneficiaries, for
whose protection it was imposed? An additional difficulty is the
question of whether the promisee's recovery can be offset by
claims against the trustee arising out of unrelated transactions.
As we have seen, the majority American rule permits such set-
offs; 49 but not, apparently, where the contract requires the
promisee to look solely to the trust assets."
Perhaps, on Stone's analysis, this result can be justified as
a "transfer of the right of exoneration." 5' 1 But why, as a matter
of policy, should the trustee be permitted simultaneously to
relieve his own personal liability and to impose a greater liability
upon the trust estate than it would normally incur, if the primary
motivation of the personal liability rule is to protect beneficiaries?
Relatively few of the decisions concerning limitation of the
trustee's contract liability have dealt with the substantive and
procedural niceties of the promisee's recovery against the trust
estate. Most of the cases are actions at law by the promisee
against a trustee individually, and the courts are concerned with
the question whether, in particular contracts, the trustee has
effectively nullified his personal liability. 2 The holdings indicate
that, in the absence of a provision expressly limiting the promisee
to recovery out of trust assets, the usual rule of personal liability
will be imposed on the trustee. In a few cases, the fact that the
contract was signed by the trustee "as trustee for" a named
estate has been held sufficient indication of an agreement by the
promisee to look only to trust assets. But this form of signature
has also been held to be "mere descriptio personae," as has a
signature "as trustee," without identification of the trust estate.
The doctrine of enforceability of disclaimer clauses actually
to the extent the trustee is entitled to reimbursement; and the "direct claim" the-
ory, under which the promisee's claim is not diminished by setoffs to the trustee's
right of indemnity. Id. at 2093-94.
49. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
50. See Restatement § 271, comment c; Bogert § 715 (1960).
51. See Restatement § 268; Bogert § 716 (1960); 3 Scott § 268. See also 3
Scott §§ 271A, 271A.1, unfortunately confusing indemnity with exoneration.
52. The natural supposition is that litigation arises most frequently not be-
cause the trustee has refused to pay the promisee out of trust assets, but rather
because the trust funds are inadequate and the promisee can recover full satisfac-
tion only from the trustee individually.
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undermines the argument advanced to support personal liability
in Taylor v. Davis' Adm'x. The reader will recall that the asser-
tion "if the trustee is not bound, then no one is bound" was there
made in support of the conclusion that agency concepts could
not be utilized in deciding cases involving liability of trustees on
contracts entered into in the course of administration.53 If this
statement were true, contracts containing such disclaimers would
be illusory and unenforceable by the promisee. As we have seen,
though, this is not the case: the promisee does have a cause of
action against the trustee in his representative capacity, and can
recover out of trust assets. Thus, a more accurate statement
would be that, even if the trustee is not bound individually, liabil-
ity may nevertheless be imposed upon trust assets. It follows
that yet another rationale supporting the traditional view of
contract liability of trustees has proved fallacious.
Knowledgeable trustees can be expected to take full ad-
vantage of available techniques for limiting or nullifying personal
liability on contracts executed in the administration of trusts. The
traditional rule of personal liability thus is effective primarily as
a snare for the unwary 4 and a source of needless procedural
53. See text accompanying note 15 supra. Accord, Hussey v. Arnold, 185 Mass.
202, 70 N.E. 87 (1904); Feldman v. Preston, 194 Mich. 352, 160 N.W. 6S5 (1916).
54. See, e.g., Call v. Garland, 124 Mle. 27, 125 At. 225 (1924). The defendant,
administratrix of her husband's estate, ordered the cutting of a gravestone and re-
quested the promisee to "bill my husband's estate." She later signed a written
agreement for the purchase of the stone as 'Mrs. George H. Garland. ' The court
held that by affixing her personal signature to the contract, she voluntarily incurred
personal liability. This holding was later cited in support of a statement of law that
a person acting... in a representative capacity... may be liable person-
ally on any contract made by him unless the law (or a xv411) permits the
credit of the estate to be pledged. This is true even though the contract is
in the interest of and for the benefit of the estate.
Jones v. Silsby, 143 Ale. 27S, 279, 61 A.2d 117, 119 (1948).
In Knipp v. Bagby, 126 Md. 461, 95 AUt. 60 (1915), a trustee executed a mort-
gage on trust property as 'alter Knipp, trustee." After default and foreclosure, an
action for deficiency judgment was brought against the trustee individually. The
mortgagee testified that the defendant had told him that "'other parties were in-
terested with him in this property, but I did not go into that matter... ."' Id. at
468, 95 AtL at 62. In spite of this admission of knowledge that the mortgagor was
acting in a representative capacity, and a deliberate choice not to make further in-
vestigation, the court held that the trustee was personally liable for the deficiency.
A contrary result was reached in Boyle v. Rider, 136 Aid. 286, 110 AtL 524
(1920), on policy grounds. There, trustees for creditors of an insolvent were per-
mitted, with judicial approval, to complete the performance of a contract of the in-
solvent with the city of Baltimore for sewer construction. Their hope was to realize
profits on the contract with which to pay claims of creditors. After completion,
however, funds on hand were insufficient to pay even the plaintiff, who furnished
materials or supplies to complete the sewer construction. He then sued the trustees
individually. Although no express exculpatory clause was found in his contract with
the trustees, the court implied such a provision from the "surrounding circum-
stances." The real basis'for the holding, however, was the court's view that
while it is true that... [the trustees] could have insisted upon an express
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 19661
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
difficulty for contract creditors. These unfortunate effects are not,
as we have seen, offset by any substantial protection for bene-
ficiaries.
The trust estate functions as an economic unit or entity.
Unfortunately, its recognition as a legal entity has been delayed
by adherence to the traditional view in spite of its anachronistic
character. Ironically, the same "historical accident" that permit-
ted the development of the utility and flexibility of the trust de-
vice now serves to impede its development as a legal entity. As
a result, trust law has been denied general participation in the
development of principles of nonliability of agents and corporate
officers acting within the scope of their authority. 5 It has also
lagged behind the trend toward general recognition of unin-
corporated associations as legal entities.
IV
STATUTORY MODIFICATIONS OF THE TRADITIONAL VIEW
Leading authorities agree that, with the general merger of
law and equity in the United States, there is no real obstacle to
legal recognition of trust estates."' Such recognition has been
accorded by legislation in a number of jurisdictions.
A. Business Trusts
Business trusts have been utilized in many jurisdictions to
avoid disabilities or onerous restrictions placed on corporations. 7
agreement that they should not be personally liable for purchases honestly
made in the progress of the work, it would not have occurred to many, if
any, business men that there could be such liability, under the circumstances.
If these trustees are to be held personally responsible, it will be difficult in
the future to get responsible men to accept such positions, at the Instance
of creditors.
Id. at 297, 110 AtI. at 528-29. But see Bradner Smith & Co. v. Williams, 178 Ill.
420, 53 N.E. 358 (1899).
55. See note 29 supra.
56. The courts of law might conceivably have held that the contract of a
trustee bound him as a trustee and that a judgment against him as a trustee
could be collected by execution against the trust property. But it must be
remembered that in the early days the courts of law took no cognizance of
the trust and treated the trustee as complete owner of the property.
Bogert § 712, at 451 (1960).
"In states in which the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity
has been abolished, the procedural difficulties in permitting an action at law against
a trustee in his representative capacity should not offer any difficulty." 3 Scott §
266, at 2069.
57. The development of the law of corporations was the overshadowing fea-
ture of legal history in this country in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century. It was accompanied by unreasoning public hostility to corpora-
tions. One of the most striking features of the recent decisions of the
Courts is the evidence that business men are reverting to unincorporated
associations to carry out their purposes. ... These associations are organ-
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Because of its similarity in function and operation to other forms
of business association, the business trust has been recognized
as a legal entity for some purposes. When the instrument or
declaration of trust is duly recorded, some jurisdictions grant
express authority to acquire an assumed name in which the trust
can sue or be sued.5" Others go so far as to provide that the
trustees of a qualified business trust shall incur no personal
liability for any act, omission, or obligation arising out of the
trust's actvities. 9 Thus the entrepreneurial trustee, a business
owner-manager who has deliberately chosen the trust form as a
means of evading some aspect of the jurisdiction's business regu-
latory scheme, may receive immunity from personal liability on
contracts. But the conservatorial trustee, chosen by a settlor to
manage assets for the objects of his bounty, incurs personal liabil-
ity. This is not merely an anomalous result; it is precisely the
opposite of one's normal expectation. The person who trades for
his own benefit can reasonably expect to bear the burden of con-
tract liabilities resulting from his transactions. On the other hand,
he who deals solely on behalf of others, receiving no personal ad-
vantage from the transaction, would not ordinarily expect to incur
liability for authorized transactions. Imposition of personal liabil-
ity in the latter case, with immunity in the former, is a negation of
the concept that those who stand to benefit from economic activ-
ity should also bear the liabilities usually associated with it.
No criticism of the policy equating business trusts with other
forms of business organizations should be inferred from the fore-
going discussion. Rather, it is intended to exemplify the unsys-
tematic character of statutory modifications of the traditional rule
of personal liability of trustees. It is appropriate now to consider
other modifications, without pretense of exhaustive treatment of
ized under the terms of elaborate trust deeds and resemble dosely the
important features of corporations.
Wrightington, Unincorporated Associations ii (1916).
58. E.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 182, § 6 (19SS). This statute does not re-
lieve the trustees personal liability on contracts; hence its effect may be character-
ized as procedural. Larson v. Sylvester, 282 Mass. 352, 185 N.E. 44 (1933). In
Dolben v. Gleason, 292 Mass. 511, 198 N.E. 762 (1935), the court asserted that the
statute "does not purport to make a trust a legal entity for the purpose of making
contracts but merely permits its assets to be reached in an action at law to satisfy
debts which its trustee has contracted." Id. at 515, 198 N.E. at 764. See also Ballen-
tine v. Eaton, 297 Mass. 389, 8 N.E.2d 808 (1937).
59. E.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, § 174 (1963). In addition, it has been held
that, where an unincorporated association is permitted to sue and be sued in its
own name, its trustees are not personally liable for the performance of authorized
contracts. See Hawthorne v. Austin Organ Co., 71 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1934). But
where the association entity was not recognized, traditional liability was imposed
on the trustees by analogy to the doctrine that an agent who contracts for a non-
existent or incompetent prindpal incurs personal liability. Peeples v. Enochs, 170
Miss. 472, 153 So. 796 (1934). See Restatement (Second), Agency § 326 (1958).
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every relevant enactment. Several different statutes will be exam-
ined, with a discussion of the extent to which they actually alter
the traditional doctrine of contract liability of trustees.
B. Alabama
In 1873, Alabama enacted a statute modifying the traditional
rules in several respects. It is still in effect in substantially the
same form, and provides as follows:
A trustee, or an executor, or an administrator, may render
the estate in his hands to be administered liable for the payment
for necessary service rendered to him, or for necessary repairs
in and upon the estate, or for necessaries furnished to him, if he
be or become insolvent without making payment, and has not
charged the estate with, and obtained credit for such services,
repairs, or necessaries. 0
By permitting a direct action against the trust estate by one who
has furnished services, repairs, or necessaries, the statute benefits
the claimant in two situations: (1) if the trustee is insolvent, the
statutory procedure facilitates recovery in one action at law,
rather than the traditional action at law-creditor's bill practice;"1
(2) the statutory claim is not subject to diminution from setoffs
asserted by beneficiaries against the trustee, arising out of un-
related transactions. 2 The prescribed means of procuring re-
covery under the statutory remedy is by action at law against the
fiduciary or his successor, and beneficiaries apparently need not
be joined.0
The statutory departure from traditional rules of contract
liability is thus quite limited. It is applicable only to a narrow
category of claims, and is apparently not intended to relieve the
trustee's personal liability, but only to give the claimant an alter-
native method of recovering his claim. In fact, several jurisdic-
tions permit direct access to trust assets by holders of comparable
claims even in the absence of express legislative mandate. 4
60. Ala. Code tit. 58, § 39 (1960).
61. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
62. An entire change of the character of the demand is produced [by the
statute]. From a personal liability of the trustee, it is made a charge on the
estate, burdening the rights and interests of the cestui que trusts [sic], with-
out regard to the state of the trustee's accounts, or to the inquiry whether
he could retain the estate for its payment.
Askew v. Myrick, 54 Ala. 30, 32 (1875).
63. See Ala. Code tit. 58, § 40 (1960); Askew v. Myrick, supra note 62.
64. See, e.g., Austin v. Parker, 317 Ill. 348, 148 N.E. 19 (1925); Now v.
Nicoll, 73 N.Y. 127 (1878). In the former opinion, it is said that "where the estate
would be required to pay the trustee if he paid the claim, and the latter is insolvent
or non-resident, . . . the estate can be directly held in a proceeding in chancery."
317 Ill. at 355, 147 N.E. at 22.
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C. Connecticut
As early as 1902, Connecticut instituted a modification of the
traditional approach to fiduciary contract liability.15 In its present
form, the statute provides:
In any case in which any person has a legal claim against any
executor, administrator, guardian or trustee, growing out of moneys
paid or services rendered for the estate in the hands of such
executor, administrator, guardian or trustee, and which shouldjustly be paid out of such estate, a civil action may be brought by
such claimant against such executor, administrator, guardian or
trustee, while in office, or against the successor of any of them, if
he has ceased to hold such office. If such daim is found to be a just
one and one which ought to be equitably paid out of such estate,
judgment may be rendered in favor of such claimant, to be paid
wholly out of the estate so held by such executor, administrator,
guardian or trustee; provided, that if there is not sufficient estate
to satisfy such claim or claims in the hands of such executor,
administrator, guardian or trustee, this section shall not be so
construed as to prevent any claimant from pursuing his legal
remedy against such executor, administrator, guardian or trustee,
at his election, for the balance that may be due him, nor from
electing to hold any such official liable to his personal responsibility
for any debt contracted in the execution of such trust.00
The statute contains several noteworthy features. Its cover-
age extends to executors, administrators, guardians, and trustees
-virtually the entire spectrum of conservatorial fiduciaries. The
statutory action, however, may be brought only on claims arising
from "moneys paid or services rendered for the estate." This
clearly excludes noncontract claims. In addition, the statute has
been held inapplicable to certain contract claims asserted against
fiduciaries.
In one case, Miller's Appeal, s an administrator had compro-
mised a will contest by executing an agreement to pay the cavea-
tor a cash sum, and to "care for" her for the rest of her natural
life. The administrator's final accounting was approved by the pro-
bate court without provision for the care of the caveator, and she
appealed to the superior court. The appeal was dismissed on the
65. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 739 (1902).
66. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 52-202 (1958).
67. In Main v. Norman, 130 Conn. 600, 36 A.2d 256 (1944), the plaintiff
attempted to utilize the statute to recover from a decedent's estate the value of
sheep lost as a result of the administrator's alleged failure to keep a fence in proper
repair. In affirming a directed verdict for the defendant, the Supreme Court of
Errors asserted that, "if the neglect in this case were that of the administrator, he
could be sued only in his individual capacity, with the right on his part, should he
be called upon to make payment, to claim a credit in his accountinz to the Probate
Court." Id. at 601, 36 A.2d at 256.
68. 20 Conn. Supp. 179, 129 A.2d 357 (Super. Ct. 1956).
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ground that the appellant was not a creditor of the estate, and thus
had no standing to appeal from the order of the probate court."'
In so holding, the superior court rejected the argument that the
statute made her a creditor of the estate. It further refused to im-
pose an equitable lien upon the estate assets to secure payment of
the appellant's claim for support. No reason was given for either
conclusion.
The caveator's claim obviously did not grow out of "moneys
paid or services rendered for the estate," in a literal sense. If,
however, the contract were authorized, then even by the tradi-
tional view ultimate liability would fall upon the solvent estate,
not the administrator. Since all interested parties to the con-
troversy were before the probate court, it was in a position to
decide the authorization issue, and thereby determine whether or
not the estate would be required to indemnify the administrator
for support payments made to the caveator. Instead, the superior
court decision forced her to proceed against the administrator in-
dividually. If she should obtain recovery from him, then he would
be forced to pursue his claim for reimbursement against the
estate. On the other hand, if her judgment should go unsatisfied
she would then have to institute an action against the estate. Thus
two additional actions might eventually be necessary to dispose of
a matter that the probate court could have easily handled in the
first instance. While the claim is being perfected through the slow
and cumbersome traditional processes, the estate assets may have
been distributed and may be beyond reach.1 If its interpretation
of section 52-202 is correct, the Miller case suggests that the
statute should be amended to include all contract claims properly
payable out of the fiduciary estate.
It has been held that judgments rendered in actions brought
pursuant to the Connecticut statute must be satisfied solely out
of estate property, without recourse to the fiduciary's personal
69. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 45-288 (1958) provides that "any person ag-
grieved by" the order of the probate court may appeal to the superior court. In
Hartford Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. Malcolm-Smith, 129 Conn. 67, 69, 26 A.2d 234,
235 (1942), it was held that "no person can be aggrieved within the meaning of the
statute unless he is interested in the estate, either as creditor, legatee, or heir-at-law,
or in some pecuniary manner."
70. "If the contract obligation was properly incurred, the fiduciary might
have reimbursement from the estate, through an allowance to him in his account."
20 Conn. Supp. at 181, 129 A.2d at 358. This is scant comfort for the administrator,
since the result of the case was approval of the final accounting and distribution of
the estate. See note 71 infra.
71. Creditors are sometimes permitted to reach estate assets in the hands of
beneficiaries or legatees. See Wells-Stone Mercantile Co. v. Aultman, Miller & Co.,
9 NJ). 520, 84 N.W. 375 (1900); Restatement § 279. However, the risk of scatter-
ing and dissipation of assets is obvious.
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assets.72 This holding may appear strained in view of the express
statutory provision that the claimant may pursue his legal remedy
against the fiduciary personally, where estate assets are insuffici-
ent to provide complete recovery. This would seem to authorize
execution (the "legal remedy") out of personal assets of the fidu-
ciary. The statute, however, has not been so construed. The rea-
soning has been that the statutory remedy is cumulative, not
exclusive. Thus the common-law action against the fiduciary in-
dividually is neither merged into nor superseded by the statutory
remedy.7"
Connecticut procedure apparently permits an action in the
alternative against the fiduciary personally as well as in his repre-
sentative capacity. This gives a court of law the opportunity to
specify whether the plaintiffs recovery will be rendered out of
the defendant's personal assets or the estate property.74 Thus, if
his claim is of the sort described in the statute, the creditor can
secure a complete adjudication in one action. Since it does not
affect the trustee's individual liability, but merely authorizes a
direct action against the trustee in his representative capacity,
this statute may be characterized as procedural in nature. This
conclusion is further fortified by the limitation of the statutory
remedy to claims which "ought to be equitably paid out of such
estate"--a clear indication that no liberalization of conditions
justifying recovery against trust assets is intended.
It can be argued, however, that even the limited procedural
changes wrought by the statute contain an element of danger.
Since there is no provision for making beneficiaries parties to the
statutory action, the trustee may be able to conceal a legitimate
issue as to his authority to make the contract, resulting in an ex-
penditure of trust assets for unauthorized claims. In rebuttal, it
may be contended that the trial judge hearing the evidence will
be solicitous of the interests of the beneficiaries. Also, since the
statutory remedy is limited to cases where the plaintiff has paid
money or performed services, the estate has presumably bene-
fitted from the transaction.75 Of course, the beneficial interests
72. Bock v. Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 135 Conn. 94, 60 A.2d 918
(1948).
73. See Hewitt v. Beattie, 106 Conn. 602, 614, 138 AUt. 795, 80 (1927):
This statute does not change the nature of the obligation incurred by an
executor or administrator in the performance of his duties; it merely affords
the creditor a remedy by which, without injustice to the estate, the obliga-
tion owed him may be discharged immediately.
74. In American Sur. Co. v. Mchlullen, 129 Conn. 575, 30 A.2d 564 (1943),
an action was brought against two co-executors, individually and in their repre-
sentative capacities, to recover alleged misappropriations by one of them. Judgment
was rendered against the wrongdoer, but in favor of the estate and the other co-
executor who neither knew of nor benefitted from the wrongful acts.
75. In cases where the contract has conferred a benefit upon the estate, some
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are exposed to no more risk of loss through unauthorized pay-
ments than they ordinarily bear anyway.
D. Georgia
Georgia abrogated the traditional rules of trust and trustee
liability in 1856, with the enactment of a statute which is still
in effect. The following provisions indicate its thrust:
Any person having a claim against any trust estate for serv-
ices rendered to said estate, or for articles or property or money
furnished for the use of said estate, or any claim for the payment
of which a court of equity would render said estate liable, may
collect and enforce the payment of such claim in a court of law.70
If there is no trustee, or if he is a mere naked trustee and
nonresident in the county, the cestui que trust shall be made the
defendant, and the proceedings shall be, in all respects, the same
as when the trustee is defendant.77
The judgment thus rendered shall impose no personal liability
on the trustee, or in any way render his property liable for the
payment of the same; but said judgment shall only bind such trust
estate, and execution shall issue accordinglyY8
All executions issued upon judgments rendered under the
provisions of Section 108-501 to 108-505 shall specify in the body
of the execution the property upon which the same is to be levied,
and it shall be levied on no other property.79
On its face, this statute appears to embody a more substantial
alteration of the traditional approach to trust and trustee liability
than the Connecticut statute.
For example, the statutory classification of claims is quite
broad: where the Connecticut statute was limited to claims for
money paid or services furnished to the estate, 0 section 108-501
includes in addition to these categories "any claim for the pay-
ment of which a court of equity would render said estate liable."
Although this clause could be subjected to a narrow interpretation
under the canon of ejusdem generis, the Georgia Court of Appeals
has held that the statute authorizes even tort actions against the
trust estate.81
A number of decisions indicate that this statute, like the Con-
necticut enactment, imposes no requirement that the claimant
cases have permitted recovery out of trust assets even though the trustee may be in
default. See Manderson's Appeal, 113 Pa. 631, 6 AtI. 893 (1886); Restatement §
269, comment a; 3 Scott §§ 269, 269.1.
76. Ga. Code Ann. § 108-501 (1959).
77. Ga. Code Ann. § 108-503 (1959).
78. Ga. Code Ann. § 108-505 (1959).
79. Ga. Code Ann. § 108-506 (1959).
80. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
81. Burgess v. James, 73 Ga. App. 857, 38 S.E.2d 637 (1946).
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join the beneficiaries as parties to the action. 2 One case, Clark v.
Flannery & Co.,' held that minor beneficiaries were bound by a
judgment against the trustee on several notes executed for the
estate even though (1) the trustee had not defended the action;
(2) it was alleged that he had applied the proceeds to his own use;
(3) there were alleged setoffs or credits which could have been
interposed against the creditor's claim; and (4) facts were al-
leged which tended to show that the trustee had colluded with the
claimant to assure entry of the default judgment against the trust
estate. The beneficiaries petitioned for an injunction to prevent
execution of the default judgment on these averments, but a
demurrer to their petition was sustained. The beneficiaries were
thus relegated to their equitable claim for repayment against the
trustee," who was their father, and allegedly insolvent.
This harsh result seems unwarranted. Unfortunately, the
court ignored Meyer v. Butt & Brother,8 5 an earlier decision on
point. There a beneficiary was permitted to show that the trustee
conspired with the claimant to defraud her. The allegations were
quite similar to those in Clark v. Flannery & Co.: that the
trustee used proceeds of a note for his own purposes, then suf-
fered a default judgment in an action brought against him in his
representative capacity, and was insolvent at the time the bene-
ficiary sought to enjoin execution of the default judgment against
trust property. In granting relief to the beneficiary, the Georgia
Supreme Court stated that
generally, a trust-estate is bound by a judgment against the
trustee. But we do not agree that this rule applies to a case where,
by the very nature of the suit, it is [in] the interest of the trustee
to have the judgment rendered.... The interest of the trustee is
with the plaintiff, and [it] is a perversion of the whole intent of
the trust to permit his neglect, or his act to bind the trust property
for his own benefit. 86
The apparent conflict between these two cases was resolved
in favor of the Meyer case in Shelling v. American Freehold Land
Mortgage Co.W There a judgment creditor attempted to levy exe-
82. Sanders v. Houston Guano & Warehouse Co., 107 Ga. 49, 32 SE. 610
(1899); Josey v. Union Loan & Trust Co., 106 Ga. 603, 32 S.E. 628 (1899); Bur-
gess v. James, supra note 81; Zeigler v. Perry, 37 Ga. App. 647, 141 SE. 426 (1928).
83. 99 Ga. 239, 25 S.E. 312 (1896).
84. Paragraph one of the court's syllabus states that "if the trustee was un-
faithful to his trust in improperly allowing the judgment to be rendered, he and
his sureties, if any, are liable to the beneficiaries thus injured." Id. at 239, 25 SE.
at 312.
85. 44 Ga. 468 (1871).
86. Id. at 471-72.
87. 107 Ga. 852,33 S.E. 634 (1899).
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cution on homestead property of the debtor. The debtor's wife
sought to enjoin execution on behalf of herself and her children.
The court held that the debtor, as head of the household, was
trustee for his family and charged with a duty to protect their in-
terests in the homestead. The creditor argued that, under the
statute, the judgment against the debtor was binding on his
family. The court rejected this argument and ordered the injunc-
tion, citing Meyer v. Butt & Brother. The opinion asserts that the
debtor "had no power or authority to consent to a judgment which
would have the effect of binding the trust estate to pay his in-
dividual debt." '88 The result appears to be correct." If suffering
the default judgment was a breach of the fiduciary duty to defend
the action, then the claimant who participated in the breach
should not be permitted to profit from it."
Section 108-505 appears to relieve the trustee from personal
liability on contracts executed during the administration of the
trust. In fact, an early decision held that, in an action pursuant to
the statute, the trustee "is a mere nominal party, so far as per-
sonal interest in the suit is concerned, charged with the duty of
defending the action, not on his own behalf, but on behalf of the
cestuis que trust." 91 It would seem reasonable to conclude that
a judgment rendered in favor of the claimant does not subject the
trustee to personal liability for any portion remaining unpaid
after trust assets have been exhausted. But can he pursue his
action at law against the trustee? This depends upon whether the
statutory remedy is exclusive, or merely cumulative.
The first clue was provided in Faulk v. Smith.02 There the
creditor received a judgment against the trustee individually, for
an obligation incurred on behalf of the trust estate. Execution
having been returned unsatisfied, the creditor brought an action
at law against the trustee in his representative capacity, seeking
to subject the trust assets to payment of his claim.03 The defend-
ant interposed a defense of res judicata, contending that the claim
against the trust estate could have been litigated in the action
against the trustee individually. This argument was rejected with
88. Id. at 856, 33 S.E. at 635.
89. Absent allegations of fraud or collusion, however, the beneficiaries arc
bound by the judgment. See cases cited in note 82 supra; Wagnon v. Pease, 104
Ga. 417, 30 S.E. 895 (1898).
90. Restatement § 310; Bogert §§ 901, 904 (1962) ; 3 Scott § 310.
91. Wagnon v. Pease, 104 Ga. 417, 433, 30 S.E. 895, 901 (1898).
92. 168 Ga. 448, 148 S.E. 100 (1929).
93. The report contains no intimation as to why the creditor chose not to
bring a bill in equity. Quaere: does the statutory action relieve the creditor from
setoffs representing claims asserted by the beneficiaries against the trustee, arising
out of unrelated transactions?
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the assertion that "the original proceeding did not make the
cestuis que trust parties, nor did the creditor proceed against the
rem."94 Thus the first judgment was validly rendered against the
trustee personally, and did not bar a later action against him in
his representative capacity. The opinion implies that the statutory
remedy is not exclusive. If it were, the holding would be the
same, but for a different reason: the first action would then be a
nullity, and the second suit the creditor's proper means of seek-
ing recovery. There is, however, no such intimation in the opinion.
The question was squarely presented in the recent case of
Oberdorfer v. Smith. 5 The plaintiff sued the trustee individually
to recover usurious interest charges90 on a loan the defendant
made to her out of trust assets. The defendant demurred on the
ground that the plaintiff's exclusive remedy was the statutory
action for recovery out of trust assets. The trial court overruled
the demurrer, and the court of appeals affirmed. Its point of
departure was that the statutory action, being in derogation of the
common law, should be strictly construed. From this premise, the
court reached the conclusion that "this new method is merely
cumulative of the common-law, and it does not abolish the com-
mon law liability of the trustee personally either in tort or con-
tract.' 97 That the statute is in derogation of the common law does
not necessarily justify the conclusion that its remedy was in-
tended to be cumulative; the purpose of the statute might well
have been to abrogate the common law on this very point. Yet
no attempt was made to ascertain the purpose of the enactment. 8
The opinion relied upon an earlier court of appeals decision hold-
ing that, where a claimant had contracted with trustees to provide
personal services, her complaint set forth a good cause of action
94. 168 Ga. at 450, 148 S.E. at 102.
95. 102 Ga. App. 336, 116 SE.2d 308 (1960).
96. The maximum legal rate of interest is 8%. Ga. Code Ann. § 57-
101 (1960). The penalty for usury is forfeiture of the interest charged. Ga. Code
Ann. § 57-112 (1960).
97. 102 Ga. App. at 339, 116 S.E.2d at 310.
98. There are indications that the statute was intended to effect a procedural
change only; this tends to support the conclusion that it is cumulative rather than
exclusive. For instance, § 108-501 is couched in permissive rather than mandatory
terms: the claimant may collect his claim in a court of law. The effect of the statute
was described in Moore, Jenkins & Co. v. Lampkin, 63 Ga. 748, 751-S2 (1879), as
follows: "An ordinary common law judgment cannot be enforced against ...
[trust] property. It requires equitable proceedings to reach the property or the in-
come; but these equitable proceedings may be, at the option of the suitor, either in
a court of equity or a court of law .... [E]specially may the proceedings be
had at law when a perfect statutory remedy is furnished by the statute of 1855-6.
AIso, the decision in Faulk v. Smith, 168 Ga. 448, 148 S.E. 100 (1929), implies
that the statutory remedy is not exclusive. See text accompanying notes 92-94 supra.
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against the trustees individually, but where the evidence tended
to show that she had contracted with the trustees in their repre-
sentative capacity, the personal judgment against the trustees
would be reversed. 9 Since no authority was cited for the first
proposition, and the statute was not mentioned in the opinion, the
case would appear to be scant authority for the holding in Ober-
dorfer v. Smith.
The Oberdorfer opinion further relied upon the argument
that, since section 108-506 requires the property subject to execu-
tion in the statutory action to be specified in the "body of the
execution," and since it is possible for the trustee to conceal in-
tangible trust property from the claimant, the statutory remedy
presents opportunities for evasion of just debts. From this argu-
ment the court concluded that "obviously, then, of necessity, this
statutory remedy is merely cumulative and in no wise did it abol-
ish the common-law rule for obtaining redress." 00 It is unclear
whether the court felt that the legislature did not intend such a
result, or whether the court was simply unwilling to permit it. In
any event, the reasoning is specious. The trustee can as easily
conceal his own intangible personalty from the sheriff seeking to
levy execution on a judgment against him as he can hide the trust
intangibles. He would have, if anything, a stronger motivation to
conceal his own property. Since the possibility of concealment is
present in every levy of execution, it furnishes no support for the
conclusion reached in Oberdorfer v. Smith.
Furthermore, it was not necessary to decide this issue. The
holding can be justified even if it be assumed that the statutory
remedy is exclusive. Arguably, the statute is not even applicable to
the facts of the case. The plaintiff furnished no money, property,
or services to the trust estate; nor is a usury claim one "for the
payment of which a court of equity would render said estate
liable."'' Since no action could be brought pursuant to the
statute to collect such a claim, the plaintiff perforce is left to her
common-law action against the trustee individually. The case thus
offers no substantial impediment to a later holding that, with
respect to claims of the sort enumerated in the statute, the statu-
tory remedy is exclusive-at least in cases where the claimant
knew or should have known that he was dealing with a trustee.
In spite of this restrictive judicial construction, the statute
provides relief from one of the most cumbersome and vexatious
99. Pelotte v. Simmons, 41 Ga. App. 198, 152 S.E. 310 (1930).
100. 102 Ga. App. at 340, 116 S.E.2d at 311.
101. Ga. Code Ann. § 108-501 (1960). Since the penalty for usury is forfeiture
of interest (note 96 supra), no payment out of trust funds could be contemplated
by the claimant.
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aspects of the traditional procedure. The creditor may receive
satisfaction in one action at law, even though the trustee is in-
solvent. In addition, permitting the claimant to sue the trustee
both individually and in his representative capacity obviates mul-
tiple actions (1) where the application of the statute is doubtful,
and (2) where the plaintiff has a cause of action against both the
trustee and the trust estate, but neither has sufficient assets to
afford full recovery.
E. "Agency" Statutes
In 1865, the Field Commission unsuccessfully proposed the
adoption by New York of the following statute:
A trustee is a general agent for the trust property. His author-
ity is such as is conferred upon him by the declaration of trust,
and by this chapter, and none other. His acts, within the scope of
his authority, bind the trust property to the same extent as the
acts of an agent bind his principal.10 2
Seven years later, California adopted this "enigmatic declara-
tion,"'w which was later enacted by three additioial Western
statesY 4 This statute flatly contradicts the assertion that "a
trustee is not an agent."' 05
But who is the principal? Obviously, there is no individual
who fits the designation-not even the settlor of an inter vivos
trust. '0 On a functional level, however, what more is required
of a "principal" than a source of instructions by which the scope
of the agent's authority and powers can be measured, and an
102. Field & Bradford, The Civil Code of the State of New York § 1202, at
358 (1865). Scott says "the concept of property as a principal and as exercsing
control over the person entrusted with the property is most unorthodox. However,
the purpose ... is to enable a third person to reach the trust estate but not to
impose a personal liability upon the beneficiaries." 3 Scott § 274, at 2113.
103. Cal. Civ. Code "§ 2267. Sections 2215-89 of the Civil Code consist of
proposals of the Field Commission that were rejected by the legislature of New
York. An eminent authority has said of the Field trust code that, "numerous as
were its faults, it was at least conceived as an integrated and comprehensive scheme
of trust law, with premises radical but certainly not irrational." Evans, Observa-
tions on the State, etc., of the California Laws of Uses and Trusts, 28 So. Cal. L.
Rev. 111 (1955). The characterization of § 2267 as an "enigmatic declaration" is
also Evans'. Id. at 120.
104. Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 86-507 (1964); NJ). Cent. Code Ann. § 59-
02-10 (1960); S.D. Code § 59.0209 (1939). The South Dakota statute has, how-
ever, been superseded by enactment of the Uniform Trusts Act. S.D. Code § 59.0512
(Supp. 1960).
105. See text accompanying note iS supra. But d. Scott, Liabilities Incurred
in the Administration of Trusts, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 725, 741 (1915): "although the
trustee is not an agent of the cestui que trust, he is in a sense an agent of the
estate."
106. The settlor as such is not liable for the trustee's acts, nor has he any
power to enforce the trust. Restatement § 200, comment b.
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economic entity to respond to claims arising out of the agent's
activities? Trust estates have a source of authority, the trust in-
strument as supplemented by rules of trust administration in
effect in the jurisdiction; and they provide an aggregation of
assets out of which properly incurred liabilities can be paid. Why,
then, cannot the trust estate function as a "principal"? In equity,
it has been so regarded for centuries; there is no longer any sub-
stantial impediment to legal recognition of the trust entity.10 7
Adoption of the agency concept has its drawbacks. For one
thing, it may tend to create confusion with respect to settled
rules of personal liability of beneficiaries for contracts of trustees.
Although normally beneficiaries are immune from such liability,
several cases have reached a contrary result on the ground that
the beneficiary's control over the trustee rendered him in reality
just an agent of the beneficiary, and therefore the latter is liable
for the trustee's authorized acts.108 Confusion of "agency" for
purposes of holding the trust estate responsible for the trustee's
authorized contracts with "agency" for purposes of holding the
beneficiary personally liable could lead to most unfortunate re-
sults. 0 9 Thus the statute should be viewed as suggesting an
agency analogy, rather than converting a trustee into an agent or
literally imposing the rules of agency upon the trust relationship.
The principal problem presented by the statute, therefore, is
how far the agency analogy should be applied in any given case.
For instance, an agent for a disclosed principal incurs no personal
liability for acts within the scope of his authority."' What of the
trustee who executes an authorized contract on behalf of the trust
estate?
Several California cases have considered the problem. In
Hall v. Jameson,"' a trustee executed a note secured by a mort-
gage on trust property, under authority granted by the trust in-
strument. He received no personal benefit from the transaction.
His status as a trustee was explicitly set forth in the mortgage
recitals, but the agreements and covenants of the mortgage were
phrased in the first person singular. The California Supreme
107. See note 56 supra.
108. Restatement §§ 274-75; 3 Scott §§ 274-75.
In addition, a number of cases have held the beneficiaries of business trusts
personally liable for contracts entered into by the trustee on a partnership analogy,
because of the degree of "control" they possess over the trustee's activities. See
Comment, Massachusetts Trusts, 37 Yale L.J. 1103, 1108-14 (1928).
109. Any modification tending to strengthen the possibility that beneficiaries
may incur personal liability for the trustee's acts would weaken the utility of tho
trust device as a means of separating the benefits of property ownership from its
managerial burdens.
110. See note 29 supra.
111. 151 Cal. 606, 91 Pac. 518 (1907).
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Court held that the trustee was personally liable on the note. The
effect of the statute was limited by the statement that it
refers to the trust property alone. His [the trustee's] acts respect-
ing that property, if authorized by the terms of the trust, bind the
property. He is to tlhat extent an agent for the property and for
the interested parties.?' 2
Thus the statute was construed to be remedial, extending the
claimant's remedies at law, rather than altering the substantive
rules respecting a trustee's personal liability." 3
Some twenty years later, the same court decided Irvine v.
MacGregor.2' There, trustees of a business trust were assignees
of an oil lease. The lessor sued the lessee and these assignees for
royalties due under the lease, and obtained a judgment against
the defendants. The liability of the trustees, however, was
limited to the property of the trust estate. Defendant trustees
appealed, urging that the lower court improperly imposed liability
on the trust estate. It was their position that the lessor was only
entitled to a judgment against them individually. This argument
was rejected by the court, which cited the foregoing statute for
the proposition that the authorized acts of the trustee bind the
trust estate. Furthermore, added the opinion, the provision of the
judgment restricting it to trust property was inserted for the
protection of the trustees. (The court must have assumed that
the trustees would ordinarily be personally liable, otherwise they
would need no such protection.) Later California cases have con-
sistently held that the statute does not alter traditional rules as to
the trustee's personal liability. 15
This view has not prevailed in Montana, however. There,
the agency statute has been interpreted to relieve the trustee
from personal liability for authorized contracts."' This result
seems warranted by the terms of the statute,11 7 and has been
112. 151 Cal. at 612, 91 Pac. at 520. (Emphasis added.)
113. The result is changed by the Negotiable Instruments Law and the Uni-
form Commercial Code. See p. 521 infra and text accompanying note 164 infra.
114. 203 Cal. 583, 265 Pac. 218 (1928).
115. See Evans, supra note 103, at 120-21: "Arguably a trustee who signs in
that capacity is relieved of personal liability, but the cases say not1" citing Gold-
water v. Oltman, 210 Cal. 408, 292 Pac. 624 (1930), and Zimmer Constr. Co. v.
White, 8 Cal. App. 2d 672, 47 P.2d 1087 (1935). In Purdy v. Bank of America Natl
Trust & Say. Ass'n, 2 Cal. 2d 298, 40 P.2d 481 (1935), the California Supreme
Court held that the statute creates a direct cause of action against the trust estate.
This was considered a step toward elimination of the trustees personal liability for
authorized contracts by some commentators, but no California case has so held.
116. Tuttle v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 112 Mont. S68, 119 P.2d 884 (1941).
117. Its effect must be either that the trust estate is to be considered an entity
chargeable as a principal for the acts of the trustee, its agent, or that the
legal incidents of the trustee's authorized acts, so far as the parties are
concerned, are the same as those which would attach to an agent's author-
ized transaction for his principal.
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favorably received by at least one California commentator.118
But the agency statute presents other problems. For in-
stance, how is the extent of the trustee's authority to contract
determined? One California appellate court decision indicated
that, "in the absence of express authorization either in the decla-
ration of trust, or otherwise, he will be deemed to be personally
liable for obligations which he incurs .... "'I' This view may in
part reflect a narrow interpretation of the statutory declaration
that the trustee's authority is "such as is conferred . . . by the
declaration of trust, and by this chapter, and none other." It
seems unduly restrictive, especially in view of the doctrine of
implied authorization to perform any act necessary to accomplish
the trust purposes.!" A statement more closely attuned to this
doctrine appears in another California opinion: "the trust rela-
tion being admitted, and the act being shown to have been reason-
ably necessary to protect and preserve the fund as in cases of
ordinary agency... it may reasonably be inferred, in the absence
of proof to the contrary, that the trustee acted within his au-
thority." "' This latter approach was adopted by the Supreme
Court of California in Purdy v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust &
Say. Ass'n: 1
22
No claim is made that the authority [to borrow] is expressly con-
ferred by the language of the testamentary trust or by the pro-
visions of the Code; but it is contended by the defendant that
from the history of the operations of the trustees and from the
facts produced on the trial, it is conclusively shown that the power
to borrow money was necessarily incident to the power to manage
and conduct the ranch in order to preserve the estate from ap-
preciable loss.
Assuming that a claimant has a good statutory cause of
action against the trust estate, must he join all beneficiaries as
defendants or is service upon the trustee sufficient? It has been
held that, where the trustee has the right to sue alone on behalf
of the estate "it necessarily follows that he could be sued as a
representative of the cestui que trust" without joinder of the
In either view .. we must hold .. that the trustee is not person-
ally liable but that the remedy is an action against it as trustee, and that
a judgment against it in that capacity is limited in its application to the
trust estate.
Id. at 578, 119 P.2d at 888.
118. See Tepper, Liability of the Trust Estate Arising Out of Trustee's Con-
tracts With Third Persons, 2 Hastings L.J. 53, 60-61 (1950).
119. Duncan v. Dormer, 94 Cal. App. 218, 221, 270 Pac. 1003, 1004 (1928).
120. See Restatement § 186(b).
121. Cullinen v. Mercantile Trust Co., 80 Cal. App. 377, 385, 252 Pac. 647,
650 (1926).
122. 2 Cal. 2d 298, 302, 40 P.2d 481, 482.(1935).
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beneficiaries.' But this is a non sequitur: when the trustee is the
plaintiff, there is no conffict of interest between him and the bene-
ficiaries. Such a conflict may well exist where the trustee is de-
fendant. In recognition of this possibility, the California decisions
hold that joinder of beneficiaries is not necessary "so long as the
trustee acts in good faith, and his own interests are not in conflict
with those of the beneficiary." 4 The test seems to be whether the
trustee can reasonably be expected to represent the interests of
the beneficiaries; if so, they need not be joined. But in any situa-
tion where the trustee's authority may be questioned, or the ap-
plicability of the statute is otherwise doubtful, the possibility of
a conflict of interest indicates that the prudent course is to join
the beneficiaries as parties to the action."
Suppose the claimant is unsure whether the contract was
authorized or not, but desires to conclude the litigation in one
action. May he bring an action in the alternative against the
trustee in both his individual and representative capacities? The
statute itself contains no apparent impediment to such a pro-
cedure. 6
In summary, the agency statute as judicially interpreted con-
stitutes only a slight departure from the traditional view. In
California, where individual liability of the trustee is preserved,
its effect is procedural only: the claimant is permitted direct
access to the trust fund. In doubtful cases he may join the trustee
individually and in his representative capacity, but it may also
be necessary to join the beneficiaries.
The Montana interpretation of this statute constitutes a
breakthrough in the movement toward a trust entity theory which
tends to equate the trustee with an agent or a corporate official. It
is to be hoped that other jurisdictions with similar statutes will
follow Montana's lead.
That the agency analogy represents a sound alternative to
the traditional view is recognized by the draftsman of Revised
Part Four of the Model Probate Code. He proposes that the
123. MIerz v. IMehner, 57 Wash. 324, 327, 106 Pac. 1118, 1120 (1910).
124. Johnson v. Curley, 83 Cal. App. 627, 634, 257 Pac. 163, 166 (1927).
Accord, Alexander v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 48 Cal. App. 2d 488, 119 P.2d 992
(1941).
125. Johnson v. Curley, supra note 124, recognized that an exception can be
granted where "the beneficiaries are so numerous as to make it 'intolerably oppres-
sive to require the plaintiff to bring them all into court."' 83 Cal. App. at 633,
257 Pac. at 166.
126. In Olson v. Foster, 42 Cal. App. 2d 493, 109 P.2d 388 (1941), the claim-
ant sued a trustee individually and in his representative capacity, to recover the
value of services rendered. After issue was joined, he amended his complaint by
deleting the cause of action against the trustee individually. Since the action then
"sounded in equity," it was tried by a judge without a jury.
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personal liability of protectors of persons under disability12 7 be
that of "an agent for a disclosed principal. A protector, or
limited protector is not personally liable on contracts properly
entered into in his fiduciary capacity in the course of administra-
tion of the trust unless he expressly agreed to be."'1 8 This ap-
proach is precisely the converse of the traditional view.
F. Uniform Trusts Act
In 1937, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws adopted the Uniform Trusts Act for the purpose,
inter alia, of doing away with "a few obsolete and unjust rules of
trust law which have come about through unfortunate judicial de-
cisions or are survivals of ancient property law.' 2 0 Section 12
of the Uniform Trusts Act was drafted in furtherance of this
objective, 30 and provides as follows:
§ 12. Contracts of Trustee.-1. Whenever a trustee shall
make a contract which is within his powers as trustee, or a
predecessor trustee shall have made such a contract, and a cause of
action shall arise thereon, the party in whose favor the cause of
action has accrued may sue the trustee in his representative
capacity, and any judgment rendered in such action in favor of the
plaintiff shall be collectible [by execution] out of the trust prop-
erty. In such an action the plaintiff need not prove that the
trustee could have secured reimbursement from the trust fund if
he had paid the plaintiff's claim.
2. No judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff
in such action unless he proves that within thirty days after the
beginning of such action, or within such other time as the court
may fix, and more than thirty days prior to obtaining the judg-
ment, he notified each of the beneficiaries known to the trustee who
then had a present interest, or in the case of a charitable trust the
127. This proposal for revision of the Model Probate Code introduces Inter-
esting terminology: a person adjudged disabled (by reason of infancy, mental in-
competence, senility, drug or alcohol addiction, imprisonment, unknown whereabouts,
-etc.) is designated a "curatel." A "protector" is one appointed by a court to manage
the "property and affairs of a curatel; a "limited protector" is a protector whose
powers are limited by his letters of protectorship. Fratcher, First Tentative Draft
of Revised Part IV, Model Probate Code §§ 401(g), 401(h) (1965).
128. Id. § 431.
129. Uniform Trusts Act, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9C Uniform Laws
Ann. 289 (1957).
130. See id. at 290:
At common law the court of law did not recognize the trustee as trustee
as being a legal person. He could not be sued at law on a contract [in
his representative capacity] .... It has been felt that this disability of the
contract creditor, which is due to the ancient distinction between law and
equity, should be removed, in the interest of facilitating collection of
claims from trust estates. Section 12 of this act allows suit against the
trustee as such at law if the contract was within the powers of the trustee
to make, and if notice is given to the beneficiaries so that they can inter-
vene in the rare case where they may object to collection from the trust
estate.
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[Attorney-General] and any corporation which is a beneficiary
or agency in the performance of such charitable trust, of the exist-
ence and nature of the action. Such notice shall be given by
mailing copies thereof in postpaid envelopes addressed to the
parties to be notified at their last known addresses. The trustee
shall furnish the plaintiff a list of the parties to be notified, and
their addresses, within ten days after written demand therefor, and
notification of the persons on such list shall constitute compliance
with the duty placed on the plaintiff by this section. Any benefici-
ary, or in the case of charitable trusts the [Attorney-General] and
any corporation which is a beneficiary or agency in the perform-
ance of such charitable trust, may intervene in such action and
contest the right of the plaintiff to recover.
3. The plaintiff may also hold the trustee who made the con-
tract personally liable on such contract, if the contract does not
exclude such personal liability. The addition of the word "trustee"
or the words "as trustee" after the signature of a trustee to a con-
tract shall be deemed prima fade evidence of an intent to exclude
the trustee from personal liability.
The Uniform Trusts Act is presently in effect in five states1 3' and
the Virgin Islands. 3 ' Provisions based on section 12 are in force
in at least two additional states, Louisiana 1" and Texas."
The principal thrust of section 12 is to provide a direct ac-
tion on authorized contracts against the trustee in his representa-
tive capacity, with execution of the resulting judgment levied
against trust assets. The recovery may not be diminished by set-
offs against the trustee's right of reimbursement, in accordance
with the Stone thesis.' Since the direct action is proper only
where the contract is within the trustee's powers, an affirmative
conclusion on the issue of authorization is apparently a juris-
dictional requirement. But who will take issue on this point? It
can be argued that the trustee's duty to defend requires him to
raise the question; but if the trustee successfully maintains that
the contract was unauthorized, he must assume personal liability
on it. Thus, his fiduciary duty is clearly in conflict with his per-
sonal economic interest.
131. Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 163.010-210 (1961); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-3-1 to
-22 (1953); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 36-24 to -46 (1950); Okla. Stat. Ann. fitL 60,
§§ 175.1--53 (1963); S.D. Code §§ 59.0501-.0523 (Supp. 1960). The Oklahoma
statute does not apply to business trusts.
132. 15 V.1. Code Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1091-1111 (1964).
133. In 1938, Louisiana became the first state to enact the Uniform Trusts
Act. In 1964, however, a new Trust Code was adopted there. La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 9:2125 (1965), is the new provision concerning contract liability of trusts and
trustees. See the discussion accompanying notes 140-41 infra.
134. The Texas Trust Act was adopted in 1943. The contract liability pro-
vision, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7425b-19 (1960), is virtually identical to
§ 12 of the Uniform Trusts AcL The Texas Trust Act does not, however, apply to
business trusts or security agreements. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arL 7425b-2 (1960).
135. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
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The requirement of notification of the pendency of the action
to all beneficiaries who have a "present" interest was probably
conceived as a check on the trustee in such a situation. The rea-
son advanced by the draftsmen for the imposition of this require-
ment was to permit beneficiaries to "intervene in the rare case
where they may object to collection from the trust estate." 180
Since the trustee's interest in contesting the validity of the
promisee's claim coincides with that of the beneficiaries, he can
reasonably be expected to provide adequate protection for their
interests. The "rare case" is probably the one in which the trustee
is only too willing to concede that the promisee's claim, if valid,
is collectible out of trust assets.
The wisdom of the notice requirement is, however, open to
question. Communication with all persons entitled to notification
can be expensive and time-consuming.117 Since the cases in which
notification would lead to intervention are "rare,"'13 and the court
must conclude that the contract was authorized as a prerequisite
to entering judgment against the trust estate anyway, it would
seem that the net benefit to beneficiaries is small, and may be out-
weighed by the expense 1 9 and inconvenience of notification. Loui-
siana has apparently so concluded. Its new Trust Code dispenses
with the duty of notification, but does permit a beneficiary to in-
tervene in the action "for the purpose of contesting the right of
the plaintiff to recover."' 4 Presumably, a Louisiana noninterven-
136. Uniform Trusts Act, Commissioner's Prefatory Note, 9C Uniform Laws
Ann. 290 (1957).
137. It is not clear who is entitled to notification in the case of private trusts.
The term "present interest" is not defined; it conceivably could be interpreted to
mean vested rather than contingent, possessory rather than future-or, more
broadly, all actual or potential beneficiaries known to the trustee.
In Cocke v. Duke University, 260 N.C. 1, 131 S.E.2d 909 (1963), It appeared
that some 2,240 individuals or associations were actual or potential beneficiaries.
The case arose on a petition for instructions by the trustees, and it was not re-
quired that all beneficiaries be before the court. Representation of each class of
beneficiaries was held sufcient, under a statute similar to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a). Sec-
tion 12 of the Uniform Trusts Act does not provide for representation where there
are a large number of beneficiaries, however.
138. No reported case arising under § 12 has been found, although some
twenty-eight years have elapsed since the Uniform Trusts Act was first adopted In
Louisiana.
139. If notification expenses are taxed against the unsuccessful defendant as
part of the costs of the action, then the trust estate would bear an unnecessary loss
in those "not-rare" instances where the beneficiaries choose not to intervene. In
addition, the Oklahoma version, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, § 175.18(B) (1963), pro-
vides for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for any minor or incompetent
beneficiary. This is consistent with the policy of providing an adequate opportunity
to intervene, but it considerably increases the cost of the action.
140. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2125(B) (1965). The comment upon this section
by the Louisiana State Law Institute indicates that the notification requirement was
eliminated because no longer necessary. 3A La. Rcv, St~t, Ann, 167 (196). Refer-
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ing beneficiary could raise the question of authorization at a
subsequent accounting, and would not be bound by a finding of
authorization in the action against the trustee. Of course, the
beneficiary bears the risk of the trustee's insolvency between the
time of the action and the time of the accounting; but, as we have
previously seen, this risk is a normal incident of trust administra-
tion and can be effectively minimized by requirements for ade-
quate bonds and reasonably frequent accountings. 11
Section 12 provides no answer to the question whether a
beneficiary who fails to intervene in the action after receiving
due notice will be permitted to contest the propriety of payment
of the claim out of trust assets in subsequent judicial account-
ings. The statute is not, of course, intended as a substitute for
judicial accountings. Beneficiaries could contend that the statu-
tory right of intervention is permissive rather than mandatory,
which indicates that it is not meant to be exclusive. In addition,
since a beneficiary is not a "party" to the statutory proceeding,
he is not bound by the judgment therein. Countervailing argu-
ments can be made to the effect that, since the trustee is a party
to the action in his representative capacity and the beneficiary is
on notice of the pendency of the action, he is bound by any judg-
ment entered against his representative." Also, if other bene-
ficiaries intervene and unsuccessfully contend that the contract
was authorized, a nonintervening beneficiary may be bound on the
theory that the issue had been fully and fairly litigated in the
action at law.143
It should be noted that the statute does not elevate the trust
estate to the status of a legally recognized entity; nor does it pur-
port to provide general relief to the trustee from personal liability
on authorized contracts. The first part of section 12(3) merely
restates the traditional rule of personal liability, in the absence of
a stipulation to the contrary. This statement is qualified, however,
ence is made to the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 742 (1960), which states
that "the trustee of an express trust is the proper defendant in an action to enforce
an obligation against the trust estate." This statute was adopted in 1960, four years
before § 9:2125(B). The Official Revision Comments asserted that it effected
no change in procedure, since notification to beneficiaries of the institution of any
action was required in any event. Thus the recent elimination of the notification
requirement does substantially change the Louisiana procedure.
141. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
142. "Where a representative brings or defends an action, the real dispute is
between the beneficiary and the third person; the dispute is not between the repre-
sentative personally and the third person." Restatement, Judgments § 80, comment
b (1942). Thus, as against the third party, the beneficiary is usually bound by the
result of the action. This does not necessarily mean, though, that be is also bound
as against the trustee--especially where the original action was framed in the alter-
native against the trustee individually and in his representative capacity.
143. See Restatement, Judgments § 86 (1942).
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to the point of nullification by the second sentence: the words
"trustee" or "as trustee" after the promisor's signature are trans-
formed from descriptio personae to prima facie evidence of an
intention to exclude personal liability.'44 How this provision ef-
fects the promisee's burden of proof is not specified. It is possible
that an analogy may be drawn to the negotiable instrument cases
wherein parol evidence is admitted to show that, at least between
the immediate parties, the intention was to limit liability to the
trust assets. But section 12, unlike the commercial statutes, ap-
parently places the burden of going forward with evidence of per-
sonal liability on the promisee.
In summary, the principal contributions of the Uniform
Trusts Act to the developing trust entity are (1) the "direct
action" against the trustee in his representative capacity and (2)
the exception to section 12(3) which, although "procedural" in
form, enhances the prospect of relief from personal liability of
trustees on authorized contracts.
G. The Commercial Statutes
Cases presenting the issue of imposition of personal lialuility
on promissory notes executed by trustees have afforded numerous
opportunities for application of the traditional view. Thus, if X
signs a note "X, trustee" the word trustee is deemed mere de-
scriptio personae and the action lies against X individually.1"4
One finds an occasional intimation that such a signature is suf-
ficiently ambiguous to permit the introduction of parol evidence.
If X can show that the payee agreed to limit his recovery to trust
assets, no personal liability will be imposed on X.14' This result
seems consistent with the view that the trustee may properly ex-
clude personal liability by agreement with the promisee. But some
opinions have concluded, from the presence of such phrases as "I
promise to pay," a sufficient indication that the trustee intended
to assume personal liability.14 7 Others have utilized agency the-
ories, concluding that the situation is analogous to a contract
entered into by an agent for an undisclosed or nonexistent prin-
cipal. 1 48
144. See text accompanying note 130 supra.
145. Hall v. Jameson, 151 Cal. 606, 91 Pac. 518 (1907), so hold in spite of the
"agency" statute. See Knipp v. Bagby, 126 Md. 461, 95 AUt. 60 (1915); McDowall
v. Reed, 28 S.C. 466, 6 S.E. 300 (1888).
146. See Mitchell v. Whitlock, 121 N.C. 166, 28 S.E. 292 (1897).
147. "This contract by its terms purports to make the defendant [trustee]
personally liable thereon, and neither the context nor the circumstances proven are
sufficient to change its effect in that particular." Hall v. Jameson, 151 Cal. 606,
609-10, 91 Pac. 518, 519 (1907). This same reasoning was employed in Duvall v.
Craig, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 45 (1817). See text accompanying note 20 supra.
148. E.g., Sparkman v. Phillips, 51 Tenn. App. 645, 371 S.W.2d 162 (1962).
See Restatement (Second), Agency § 197 (1958).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
CONTRACT LIABILITY
Where the trust estate is dearly identified in the instrument,
or the payee knows the trustee is acting in his representative
capacity, this reasoning is inapplicable. In such cases, it would
seem that a presumption of limited liability should be invoked,
placing the burden on the promisee to show that personal liability
was intended. Personal liability has nevertheless been imposed on
the trustee in such cases.'49 Apparently, the courts have con-
cluded that the uniformity of result implicit in mechanical
application of the traditional rules outweighs the harsh result oc-
casioned by holding a trustee personally liable where he reason-
ably expected not to incur liability, but failed to protect himself
with the proper form of exculpatory provision.110 Thus, one can
generalize that, at common law, promissory notes are subject to
the same rules as other types of contracts: the trustee is personally
liable unless there is an express stipulation in the note to the
contrary.151
By the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law in 1896,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws instituted a significant change in the law with respect to
trustee .liability on negotiable instruments executed in a repre-
sentative capacity. As approved by the Commissioners, Section
20 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides:
Where the instrument contains or a person adds to his
signature words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a
principal, or in a representative capacity, he is not liable on the
instrument if he was duly authorized; but the mere addition of
words describing him as an agent, or as filling a representative
character, without disclosing his principal, does not exempt him
from personal liability.
The effect of this proposal on liability of agents rendered it
quite controversial. By negative implication, it indicates that an
unauthorized agent is liable on the note. This changed the English
and majority American view that the unauthorized agent was
liable only for damages caused by breach of an implied warranty
of authority to execute the note. Thus, if the principal was bank-
rupt at the time the note was signed, the payee would receive no
recovery from the agent, because he suffered no damage from the
149. "While plaintiff knew, of course, that the contract was signed on behalf
of a trust, it knew nothing about the trust agreement and had no notice of its
exculpatory clauses." Royal L. Brockob Constr. Co. v. Trust Co., 6 Ill. App. 2d 56S,
568, 128 N.E.2d 620, 621 (1955). See McGovern v. Bennett, 146 Mich. 558, 109
N.W. 1055 (906); Roger Williams Natl Bank v. Groton Mfg. Co., 16 RI. 504,
17 At. 170 (1889); Connally v. W.H. Lyons & Co., 82 Tex. 664, 18 S.W. 799
(1891); McIntyre v. Williamson, 72 Vt. 183, 47 AtL. 786 (1900).
150. For an illustration of this result, see the Call case discussed in note 54
supra.
151. See Britton, Bills and Notes § 165 (2d ed. 1961).
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breach of implied warranty. Under section 20, though, the un-
authorized agent would be liable on the note itself.152 This repre-
sented an alteration of the draftsmen's original proposal,1~3 the
soundness of which was debated by leading authorities of the
time.
54
None of these experts took notice of the implication of the
phraseology extending the effect of section 20 to all persons who
execute negotiable instruments in a "representative capacity"
with disclosure of their principal. Perhaps it was assumed that,
since by the traditional view a trustee had no principal, section
20 would not apply to trustees. A number of cases have held, how-
ever, that where the trust is identified,' 5 the trustee incurs no
personal liability on a negotiable instrument.' Where the trust
estate is not identified, though, the final clause of section 20 in-
dicates that the trustee is personally liable.1  Several judicial
152. By implication only; but later so held, in New Ga. Nat'l Bank v.
J. & G. Lippmann, 249 N.Y. 307, 164 N.E. 108 (1928), and many other cases. See
Britton, supra note 151, § 166.
153. Section 20 was copied from Article 99 of the German Exchange Law.
See McKeehan, The Negotiable Instruments Law, in Brannan, The Negotiable In-
struments Law Annotated 472, 494 (3d ed. 1920).
The original draft proposal was:
Where a person adds to his signature words indicating that he signs for or
on behalf of a principal, or in a representative capacity, he is not liable on
the instrument; but the mere addition of words describing him as an
agent, or as filling a representative character, does not exempt him from
personal liability. In determining whether a signature is that of the prin-
cipal or of the agent by whose hand it is written, that construction is to
be adopted which is most favorable to the validity of the instrument.
Crawford, Annotated Negotiable Instruments Law 28 n.(a) (2d ed. 1902).
154. See Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 14 Harv. L. Rev. 241, 247
(1900), for a criticism of § 20, in the bankrupt principal situation. Brewster,
A Defense of the Negotiable Instruments Law, 10 Yale L.J. 84, 90 (1901), argues
that the result reached by § 20 is just. McKcehan tended to agree with Brew-
ster, and saw practical advantages as well:
The rule will tend to increase negotiability, by assuring the holder that
if the pretended principal cannot be reached because of lack of authority
in the agent, a recovery may be had on the instrument itself against the
agent. Then there is the additional advantage--which on reflection will
appear to be of great importance-that the liability of the agent can be
easily proved and the amount to be recovered ascertained by a more in-
spection of the instrument, whereas if the only recovery were for damages
resulting from a breach of warranty, a complicated set of disputed facts
would often go to the jury, from which it would be difficult even to
approximate the damage.
McKeehan, supra note 153, at 495.
155. Presumably, the proper form is "Y trust, by X, Trustee." The trust
estate is the "principal." Matter of Estate of Winter, 133 N.J. Eq. 245, 251, 31 A.2d
769, 774 (Prerogative Ct. 1943). "Thus a trustee, administrator or other fiduciary,
in their capacity as such, virtually become legal entities." Britton, supra note 151,
at 494.
156. Cases are collected in Britton, supra note 151, at 495 n.5; 5 Uniform
Laws Ann. pt.1, at 212 n.33 (1943).
157. The cases have so held. See Britton, supra note 151, at 495 n.6; 5 Uni-
form Laws Ann. pt.1, at 221 n.79 (1943).
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tribunals have concluded, however, that this clause is intended
to protect (1) holders in due course who have no knowledge of
the principal on whose behalf the maker is acting and (2) the
representative who has disclosed his principal. Accordingly, these
cases hold that if the payee or holder knows that the maker acted
in a representative capacity, his recovery on the instrument
should be limited to the trust assets even though the trust estate
is not therein identified." 8
As previously noted, the primary effects of section 20 were to
broaden the remedy against agents on promissory notes, and to
simplify the proof of the holder's cause of action. Since a trustee
authorized to sign the instrument who discloses his "principal" is
absolved from personal liability, the NIL actually restricts the
traditional remedy against trustees. Although the NIL bad been
adopted in every state by 1924, no jurisdiction has amended its
equivalent of section 20 so as to change this result.
This statute provides essentially the same result as the Mon-
tana interpretation of the "agency" statute. Substituting "order
and common sense for fiction and refinement of reasoning,"'" it
recognizes the trust estate as a legal entity. This approach has
evidently found acceptance in mercantile and commercial circles,
even though it does restrict the traditional remedy against the
trustee individually.
The adoption of section 20 provides a striking anomaly in
jurisdictions adhering to the traditional view of contract liability:
suppose that a trustee properly enters into two contracts with
another person, executing each "as trustee for Y." Suppose fur-
ther that one contract is a negotiable instrument and the other is
not. The trustee incurs no personal liability on the negotiable
instrument, but by the majority view he does incur such liability
on the other contract.
In recognition of this anomaly, and of the soundness of sec-
tion 20, several states have extended its rationale to other types of
contracts. For example, Pennsylvania provides that a trustee who
executes an authorized written contract as trustee of a named
trust shall incur no personal liability, and that execution of judg-
ment in favor of the promisee is limited to trust property."' 0
Although the extension of the entity concept beyond negotiable in-
158. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Lucius, 320 Ill. App. 57, 49 N.E.2d 852
(1943); Huntington Fin. Co. v. Young, 105 W. Va. 405, 143 S.E. 102 (1928). In
Megowan v. Peterson, 173 N.Y. 1, 5-6, 65 N.E. 738, 739 (1902), the court held
that, "as between the original parties and those having notice of the facts relied
upon as constituting a defense, the consideration and the conditions under which
the note was delivered may be shown."
159. Carre v. Seaman, 38 Del. 197, 202, 190 Ad. 564, 566 (1937).
160. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 320.939 (1950).
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struments is commendable, confining the statutory change to writ-
ten contracts seems questionable. Perhaps the legislature was con-
cerned about the evidentiary problems inherent in proving oral
contracts. Yet what of the agent who is permitted to testify that
he disclosed his representative capacity to the promisee before
entering into an oral contract? The evidentiary problem is the
same, but the agent's testimony is admitted and, if believed, re-
lieves him from personal liability. 1' Perhaps the Pennsylvania
statute will eventually be extended to include all contracts.
A Rhode Island statute provides that any authorized trans-
action entered into by a trustee in his representative capacity
shall be binding on the trust estate and not upon the trustee per-
sonally."0 2 This is also a commendable extension of the NIL ap-
proach, in situations where judicial findings indicate that the
transaction was authorized."'
The NIL concept is retained by the Uniform Commercial
Code, which provides:
(1) A signature may be made by an agent or other represent-
ative, and his authority to make it may be established as in other
cases of representation. No particular form of appointment is
necessary to establish such authority.
(2) An authorized representative who signs his own name
to an instrument
(a) is personally obligated if the instrument neither names
the person represented nor shows that the representative
signed in a representative capacity;
(b) except as otherwise established between the immediate
parties, is personally obligated if the instrument names
the person represented but does not show that the repre-
sentative signed in a representative capacity, or if the
instrument does not name the person represented but does
show that the representative signed in a representative
capacity.
(3) Except as otherwise established the name of an organiza-
tiorn preceded or followed by the name and office of an authorized
individual is a signature made in a representative capacity. 104
"Representative" is defined to include agents, corporate officers,
trustees, executors, administrators, and "any other person em-
powered to act for another." " ' This clarifies, but does not change,
161. Restatement (Second), Agency § 284, comment c (1958).
162. R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. J 18-4-14 (1956).
163. R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 18-4-10 (1956) provides for special proceedings to
be brought by the trustee, in which he can receive authority to sell, lease, subdivide,
or borrow on the security of trust property. Section 18-4-14 refers to liabilities
arising out of the exercise of powers thus authorized.
164. Uniform Commercial Code § 3-403. The Code is now in effect in more
than thirty states.
165. Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201(35). By contrast, the Negotiable
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the judicial interpretation of the looser NIL terminology. Another
clarification is indicated by the exception in section 3-403 (2) (b),
which in effect provides for the introduction of parol evidence
against the payee to show that an instrument was actually ex-
ecuted in a representative capacity in two situations where the
maker would otherwise incur personal liability."' Further, the
Code expressly states that the unauthorized signer is liable on the
instrument.1e 7
It is interesting to note that nowhere does section 3-403
specifically provide, as does NIL section 20, that the authorized
representative who signs in a representative capacity is relieved
from personal liability on the instrument. This omission has been
duly pointed out,:"" but was considered to be of no significance
by an eminent authority on the ground that the rule as to non-
liability of an authorized agent is "fairly implicit in the section,
well settled, and made applicable by the section on supplementary
general principles."" 9 The validity of these comments with respect
to agents is unquestioned; but what of the authorized trustee?
His exemption from personal liability is far from "well settled,"
and resort to "principles of law and equity""' would seem to
provide little support for the limited liability rule. That limited
liability is "fairly implicit" is, however, indicated by the fact that
if the traditional view were imposed, there would be no need for
section 3-403, nor would the exception provided by section 3-403
(2) (b) have any significance. Hence, the necessary conclusion
Instruments Law provides no definition of the phrase "person [who] igns... in
a representative capacity. ' However, Negotiable Instruments Law § 191 provides
that, unless the context otherwise requires, "'person' includes a body of persons,
whether incorporated or not." This furnishes some basis for the view that the word
"person" as used in § 20 applies to fiduciaries such as trustees, executors, and ad-
ministrators. See Britton, supra note 151, at 494.
166. See Uniform Commercial Code § 3-403, comment 3. The exception wrs
incorporated in the 1958 Official Text at the suggestion of the New York Law Re-
vision Commission. See Penney, A Summary of Articles 3 and 4 and Their Impact
in New York, 48 Cornell L.Q. 47, 63 (1962). It was adopted in Pennsylvania in
1959. See Legislation, 5 Vill. L. Rev. 649, 654-55 (1960).
167. Uniform Commercial Code § 3-404(1). This represents no change from
the Negotiable Instruments Law, as judicially interpreted. See note 152 supra and
accompanying text.
168. See New York Clearing House Ass'n, Report on the Uniform Commer-
cial Code 34 (1961).
169. Braucher, UCC Article 3-Commercial Paper-New York Variations, 17
Rutgers L. Rev. 57, 70 (1962).
170. Uniform Commercial Code § 1-103 provides: "Unless displaced by the
particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including ...
the law relative to capacity to contract... shall supplement its provisions!' Com-
ment 1 to this section affirms the "continued applicability to commercial contracts
of all supplemental bodies of law except insofar as they are explicitly displaced by
this Act."
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seems to be that authorized trustees incur no personal liability."'
It is difficult to overestimate the significance of these com-
mercial statutes in the movement toward judicial recognition of
the trust entity. At the present time, it appears much more likely
that the traditional view will be modified to harmonize with the
effect of these statutes than that they will be amended to restore
the traditional view.
V
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion has indicated several criticisms of
the traditional approach to contract liability of trusts and trustees,
and has considered a variety of statutory modifications. Upon
analysis, most are seen to have disadvantages and limitations,
especially in view of what appears to be a persistent tendency on
the part of the judiciary toward a somewhat restrictive interpre-
tation. If, as the commentators say, a trend has developed favor-
ing rejection of the traditional view and adoption of an entity
theory,' then its progress to date can be fairly characterized as
fitful and irregular. The statutes of Alabama, Connecticut, and
Georgia merely provide creditors with a means of direct access to
the trust estate, without altering the traditional rule imposing in-
dividual liability on the trustee. The "agency" statute is broad
enough to exclude personal liability, but only Montana has so
construed it. The Uniform Trusts Act pays lip service to indi-
vidual liability while cleverly subverting it through creation of a
contrary presumption. Only the commercial statutes have com-
pletely repudiated the traditional view-perhaps unintentionally.
We have noted that anomalies are sometimes created by the
enactment of statutes having a limited objective, such as altera-
tion of the traditional view with respect to particular types of
trusts or contracts. There is, of course, no rational justification
for a rule of trustee liability on negotiable instruments different
from that applicable to other contractual obligations, nor for a
significant difference in result which is solely dependent upon
whether a valid contract is in writing or parol. That trustees of
business trusts may enjoy greater immunity from contract liability
than conservatorial trustees is also indefensible.
But consensus regarding the most desirable conceptualistic
alternative to the traditional view is not an immediate prospect.
171. This result corresponds closely to that attained by some probate statutes,
and the Model Probate Code, with respect to claims against executors, administra-
tors, and guardians which arose during the period of administration. See, e.g.,
Model Probate Code §§ 143, 136, 227 (Simes 1946).
172. E.g., 3 Scott § 271A.1; Midgett, Trustee Liability to Third Persons, 102
Trusts & Estates 157 (1963).
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The agency approach might have proved more effective, had it not
been for such unfortunate statements as that of Mr. Justice
Woods in Taylor v. Davis' Admx.173 However, the commercial
statutes have demonstrated that legal recognition of the trust
entity can-be accomplished through a well-drafted provision utiliz-
ing the agency analogy.
The corporate officer analogy may prove even more useful,
since it offers a means of repudiating the traditional view while
avoiding confusion with settled principles of beneficiary liability
for the trustee's contracts. 174 A statute embodying this analogy
might include the following points: (1) a creditor who is in doubt
about whether or not the contract was authorized may be per-
mitted to bring an action in the alternative against the trustee in
both his personal and representative capacity; (2) the determi-
nation of the capacity in which the trustee is liable would be
rendered according to traditional agency principles; (3) if the
trustee is adjudged liable in his representative capacity, the credi-
tor's recovery would be limited to the trust assets unless the con-
duct of either the trustee or the beneficiaries justifies imposition
of personal liability on them; (4) beneficiaries need not be made
parties to the action, but may be permitted to intervene; (5) any
judgment rendered in favor of the creditor is binding on all bene-
ficiaries, except that nonintervening beneficiaries should not be
precluded from litigating the question of the trustee's authority in
a subsequent accounting proceeding.
Recognition, however belated, of the inefficiency and unfair-
ness of the traditional procedure is prerequisite to any detailed
consideration of the form of remedial legislation. It is hoped that
this discussion can contribute to that recognition.
173. 110 U.S. 330 (1884). See text accompanying note 15 supra.
174. See text accompanying notes 108-09 supra.
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